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BEYOND BEHOLDEN 
DaLin* 
Corporate law has long been concerned with director independence. In controlled 
companies, the conventional wisdom focuses on "beholdenness" as the main threat to 
independence. The prevailing theory argues that directors might feel pressured to 
reciprocate a past kindness from the controlling shareholder or fear retaliation. This 
Article argues that this conventional narrative is troublingly incomplete. I show that 
directors are also influenced by the prospect of rewards, or patronage, from the controller. 
This Article is the first to identifY controlling shareholder patronage as a systemic 
phenomenon and to explore how anticipation of future patronage can affect director 
behavior. It presents an original empirical study on professional relationships between 
directors who are nominally independent and the controlling shareholders of their firms. 
My findings reveal that these relationships are Jar more pervasive than is usually 
recognized. In fact, some controlling shareholders regularly re-appoint cooperative 
"independent" directors to senior positions and directorships at other firms under their 
control. From a director's perspective, this pattern of behavior means that the potential 
upside of getting along with the controlling shareholder is significant. I further 
demonstrate that the likelihood of patronage from the controlling shareholder depends on 
two factors: the controlling shareholder's base of controlled entities and the concentration 
of its decision-making authority. Together, these factors provide an analytic framework for 
assessing which controllers have greater potential to create conflicts of interest. 
Disaggregating controlling shareholders in this way opens up opportunities and new 
challenges for how we define independence, analyze decisions made by putatively 
independent directors, and judge the utility of independent directors as a safeguard against 
controller opportunism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Independent directors have long been a core part of corporate law's answer to the 
agency problem that arises in controlled companies. The presence of a controlling 
shareholder produces the potential for private benefits: the controlling shareholder can 
extract benefits from the corporation at the expense of other shareholders. 1 To contain this 
risk of opportunism, courts and policymakers have promoted the engagement of 
independent directors to vet contracts between companies and their controllers. 2 As Guhan 
Subramanian observes, the move to independent directors is now "standard practice" in 
1. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. In this Article, I use both "minority shareholders" and 
"public shareholders" to refer to investors other than the controller. Controllers can hold an effective majority of 
the firm's votes without owning a majority of equity rights. For instance, in a firm with a dual-class structure or 
another capital structure that separates voting rights from cash rights, controllers can have a lock on control while 
holding only a minority-even a small fraction-of total outstanding shares. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk et 
al., Stock Pyramids, Cross-Ownership, and Dual Class Equity: The Mechanisms and Agency Costs of Separating 
Control from Cash-Flow Rights, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 295, 297-301 (Randall K. Morck 
ed., 2000) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids]. 
2. See, e.g., Jn re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 529-30 (Del. Ch. 2013), ajf'd sub nom. Kahn v. 
M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) ("The premise that independent directors with the right 
incentives can play an effective role on behalf of minority investors is one shared by respected scholars sincerely 
concerned with protecting minority investors from unfair treatment by controlling stockholders."); Kahn v. Lynch 
Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1120-21 (Del. 1994) (stating that approval by a special committee of independent 
directors shifts the burden of proving the fairness of a transaction to the plaintiff); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware 
Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
673, 677-78 (2005) (explaining how Delaware's approach to conflict of interest transactions encourages the use 
of independent directors). See generally Guhan Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 11-17 (2005) 
(documenting the judiciary's promotion of independent directors as a protective device for minority shareholders 
in freezeout mergers). 
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controlled firms. 3 
The conventional notion of independence translates roughly into the absence of 
substantial prior or ongoing relationships to the controlling shareholder.4 This definition 
reflects corporate law's persistent preoccupation with "beholdenness" as the main threat to 
independence. 5 The paradigmatic concern is that a director with lucrative ties to the 
controlling shareholder may be subtly pressured by the fact that the controller can cut off 
those ties or even unseat her from the board. 6 This diagnosis, in tum, has prompted calls to 
insulate nominally independent directors from the controlling shareholder's ire. 7 
Corporate governance scholarship focuses extensively on the incentives generated by 
the controlling shareholder's ability to retaliate against insubordinate directors. What the 
literature overlooks, however, is that directors may also be influenced by the prospect of 
reward. What happens when the controlling shareholder is not angered but instead pleased? 
The result, it turns out, is often new opportunities or future benefits from the 
controlling shareholder to the favored directors. Controlling shareholders can direct their 
resources or those owned by the controlled company in ways that reward friends. For 
instance, Charles Dolan, whose family controlled Cablevision Systems until 2016, invested 
his own money with a fund founded by one of Cablevision's former "independent" 
directors. 8 Some controllers have substantial influence over other companies as well. When 
the controlling shareholder ofM & F Worldwide, Ronald Perelman, sought to "freeze out"9 
3. Subramanian, supra note 2, at 12. 
4. See infra Part H.B. I (discussing Delaware courts' approach to independence). There is a separate 
inquiry for assessing director independence under listing standards promulgated by the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and NASDAQ. See N.Y.S.E., INC., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY 
MANUAL § 303A.02 (2013) ("Independence Tests"); NASDAQ, INC., NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES § 
5605(a)(2) (2013) (definition of "Independent Director"). In cases involving controlling shareholder conflicts, 
Delaware courts treat the listing standards as illustrative but emphasize that directors' compliance with the 
standards "does not mean that they are necessarily independent [from the controller] under [Delaware] law." Kahn 
v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 648 n.26 (Del. 2014). 
5. See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 486 (2008) (describing 
Delaware's approach to independence as one that focuses on "ties that can generate a sense of 'beholdenness'"). 
6. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., The inescapably Empirical Foundation of the Common Law of 
Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 504 (2002) [hereinafter Strine, The inescapably Empirical Foundation] 
(observing that "even the independent directors will be subtly influenced by the fact that [the controlling 
shareholder] has the voting power to unseat them"); Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918-VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at 
*9 (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 2016) (explaining that directors "might feel beholden to a controller who placed them on 
the board, supported them during election season, or could fire them at any moment"); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 
694 A.2d 422, 428 (Del. 1997) (describing the risk that "those who pass upon the propriety of the transaction 
might perceive that disapproval may result in retaliation by the controlling shareholder"); Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Assaf Hamdani, independent Directors and Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (2017) 
[hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, independent Directors] (arguing that because "controllers [have] decisive 
power to appoint independent directors and decide whether to retain them, independent directors have significant 
incentives to side with the controller and insufficient countervailing incentives to protect public investors in 
conflicted decisions"). 
7. For example, Lucian Bebchuk and AssafHamdani recently proposed increasing minority shareholders' 
role in director elections, such as giving them veto rights over the appointment and termination of certain 
"enhanced-independence" directors. See generally Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6. 
8. See Cablevision Sys. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 6 (May 21, 2007) ("Since 1995, 
Charles F. Dolan, the Company's Chairman, has had a personal investment in Regent Equity Partners, a limited 
partnership in which Mr. Hochman is one of the general partners."). 
9. A freezeout is a transaction in which the controlling shareholder buys out the public shareholders of a 
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the company's minority shareholders, the company formed a special committee of four 
"independent" directors to negotiate with Perelman over the terms of his acquisition. 10 Less 
than a year after the deal closed, two members of the special committee-including the 
chairman-joined the boards of other firms under Perelman's control. 11 
This Article is the first to identify controlling shareholder patronage as a systemic 
phenomenon and to consider how anticipation of future patronage can influence director 
behavior. I study these issues using an original dataset of nominally independent directors 
who negotiated with a controlling shareholder over a freezeout transaction between 2000 
and 2014. Examining the professional connections-specifically, directorship and 
employment relationships-between those directors and controllers, I find that some 
controlling shareholders regularly re-appoint cooperative "independent" directors to 
executive and board positions at other firms under their control. 36% of the controlling 
shareholders in my sample have re-appointed at least one nominally independent director 
in this way. Illustrating this point from a different angle, 20% of the directors in my data 
have served on the board or as an executive in at least two different companies controlled 
by the same controlling shareholder. In many cases, the director was independent in the 
conventional sense when she negotiated the freezeout, meaning that she had no ongoing or 
prior connections with the controller at that time. But after the freezeout closed, she 
obtained a job at another company that the controlling shareholder controlled. From a 
director's perspective, these findings mean that she can obtain future benefits from the 
controlling shareholder if she acts in the controlling shareholder's interests. 
The likelihood of future patronage from the controlling shareholder is driven by 
factors that have not been recognized by courts. The cunent doctrinal regime is based on a 
generic and stylized idea of the controlling shareholder. But in reality, controlling 
shareholders come in different forms, hold control through different mechanisms, and 
acquire control for different reasons. Treating controlling shareholders as monolithic 
obscures the many moving parts that can affect their power to influence director behavior. 
As I show, two important determinants of this power are what I call the base of controlled 
entities and the concentration of decision-making authority. 
Base refers to the size of the network of companies over which a controlling 
shareholder has control. I find that controllers with a wider base-those that control 
multiple public companies-are much more likely to have repeat relationships with the 
nominally independent directors who serve on their boards (54.8% compared with 4.5%). 
This result makes intuitive sense: controllers with a wider base have greater ability to 
reward or sanction because they have power over more resources and more boards. 
Concentration refers to the number of actors that share the power to control within 
the controlling shareholder. I find that controllers who are single natural persons, as 
opposed to family groups or widely-held corporations, are also more likely to have repeat 
relationships with the nominally independent directors that they appoint (48.3% compared 
with 30.4% for widely-held corporations and 25% for family groups). This finding is 
consistent with classic narratives about power: a single person with consolidated control 
publicly-traded corporation. 
10. In re MFW S 'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 505-07 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
11. This information was collected from the Boardex database. See infra Part Ill.A for a description of my 
methodology. 
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has greater power to reward or sanction than a group of decision-makers who share control 
because the single person can act unilaterally and her authority over the controlled 
. l f2 company 1s p enary. 
Together, these two factors provide an analytic framework for assessing which 
controlling shareholders have greater potential to create conflicts of interest. By 
disaggregating controllers in this way, courts can move toward a more nuanced doctrine 
for constraining private benefits of control. Most concretely, courts can tailor the level of 
scrutiny given to independent directors' decisions, such as approval of a transaction 
proposed by the controlling shareholder, to the controlling shareholder's ability to 
influence director behavior. 
Ultimately, my findings illustrate how undertheorized controlling shareholders and 
the risks they pose to director independence remain. For example, doctrines concerning 
controlling shareholders do not account for real differences among the people and entities 
within that broad category; nor do they provide any explanation for why we presume that 
the bargaining dynamics are the same when nominally independent directors negotiate with 
controllers who are repeat players-such as venture capital firms that routinely obtain 
control over the firms they invest in-and when those directors negotiate with one-off 
controllers. 13 There has also been no serious discussion about how courts might obtain 
information on a director's expectations about future events, even though basic game 
theory teaches us that the director's behavior will be shaped by these beliefs. 14 Courts are 
sometimes presented with evidence that a director received post-negotiation benefits from 
the controlling shareholder15 or that a particular controlling shareholder has a reputation 
for re-appointing friendly directors to other boards, 16 but we have no principled framework 
for incorporating these insights into doctrine. This Article fills these gaps. 
12. See infra notes 129-131 and accompanying text. 
13. See Jn re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (acknowledging but disregarding 
the fact that the nominally independent directors negotiated in the shadow of the "VC ecosystem"). 
14. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 1 (1994) (explaining that game 
theory studies strategic behavior, which arises "when two or more individuals interact and each individual's 
decision turns on what that individual expects the others to do"); ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 11 (4th ed. 2007) ("Game theory is concerned with the actions of decision 
makers who are conscious that their actions affect each other."). For examples of this insight in other contexts, 
see, e.g., Rui J.P. de Figueiredo et al., The New Separation-of-Powers Approach to American Politics, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 208 (Donald A. Wittman & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2008) ("The 
courts also constrain the other players in separation-of-powers games. Because judicial action shapes policy 
outcomes, Congress, the president, and agencies will anticipate court decisions, and the potential for judicial 
review will be taken into account during the law-making process."); JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE 
ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 66 (2006) ("[I]f accounting firms were intent on 
maximizing consulting revenues, they should be prepared to acquiesce to the demands of any client in a position 
to potentially direct consulting business to them."). 
15. For example, in Jn re MFW S 'holders Litig., the plaintiffs presented evidence that one of the nominally 
independent directors on MFW's special committee joined the board of another firm controlled by MFW's 
controlling shareholder, Ronald Perelman, after the freezeout. 67 A.3d at 512. 
16. For example, in In re Ezcorp, Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litigation, the plaintiffs presented 
evidence that EZCORP's controlling shareholder, Phillip Ean Cohen, had in the past invited EZCORP's 
nominally independent directors to join the boards of EZCORP's affiliates. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting 
Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *4 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016). The plaintiffs 
also offered evidence that Cohen "clean[ ed] house" by firing those directors after they displeased him. Id. at *6. 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides background on controlled 
companies and independent directors. It briefly describes the conventional marker of 
independence-that is, the absence of any ongoing or prior relationship with the controller 
other than as a director. It also summarizes several other factors, such as social norms and 
reputation, whose impact on director independence has been the subject of some debate. 
Part II shows that, while controlling shareholders can influence nominally independent 
directors through negative threats or positive incentives, the contemporary discourse has 
overwhelmingly focused on threats. Part III presents my empirical findings on the 
professional ties between nominally independent directors and controlling shareholders. 
Building on these findings, Part III also presents a taxonomy of controlling shareholders. 
Part IV provides implications for policymakers and the Delaware courts, and Part V 
concludes. 
Before I proceed, a caveat is in order. While independent boards have become a 
mandatory part of good governance in practice, debate about the value of independent 
directors persists in the scholarly literature. 17 This Article does not enter that debate. My 
critique of directors' independence-in-fact is not meant to suggest that genuinely 
independent directors are an unalloyed good. Rather, my objective is to show that so long 
as independent directors continue to play an important role in monitoring controlling 
shareholders, we need to have a fuller account of their incentives. 
II. INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN CONTROLLED COMPANIES: THE STANDARD ACCOUNT 
The focus of this Article is on American companies with a controlling shareholder. 
While firms in the United States have historically been characterized by a dispersed 
ownership structure, controlled companies-such as Google, Facebook, and CBS-are 
becoming an important part of the modem U.S. corporate landscape. 18 According to a 2014 
study by the law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 54 of the 100 largest initial public 
offerings between September 2011 and October 2013 were of companies with one 
shareholder holding more than 50% of the voting power. 19 As of 2015, seven percent of 
companies in the S&P 1500 index have one shareholder or group holding more than 30% 
17. Compare Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007) (providing an account of independent 
directors as "an essential part of a new corporate governance paradigm" oriented toward shareholder wealth 
maximization), and Usha Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 486 (arguing that independent directors have value "in the 
specific situations where a conflict exists between the interests of management and those of the shareholder"), 
with STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 101-02 (2012) 
(observing that "the empirical evidence on the merits of board independence is mixed" and arguing that "[b ]y 
establishing a highly restrictive definition of director independence and mandating that such directors dominate 
both the board and its required committees, the [stock exchange listing standards] fail to take into account the 
diversity and variance among firms"), and Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 247-48 (2002) (concluding that the 
evidence suggests that increased board independence does not lead to better firm performance). 
18. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, at 1279 ("As of December 31, 
2016, there were 379 Russell 3000 companies with a shareholder holding more than 30% of the company's voting 
shares, and 220 of these companies had one shareholder holding more than 50% of such shares."). 
19. DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN U.S. INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS 3 (2014), https://www.davispolk.com/files/ControlledCompanySurvey.pdf. 
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of the company's voting shares.20 
This Part explains the role of independent directors in the governance of controlled 
companies, laying the groundwork for the empirical analysis in Part III. In broad strokes, I 
show that courts turned to independent directors as the best available protection against 
private benefits of control-benefits obtained by diverting value from the company and its 
other investors. I then unpack the concept of "independence" in the context of controlled 
companies, exploring both the conventional marker of independence and other prominent 
views. 
A. Independent Directors as Monitors 
Controlled companies pose different governance challenges than do widely-held 
companies.21 The agency problem facing widely-held corporations arises from the 
separation of ownership and control, which produces the potential for opportunism by 
corporate officers. 22 Because these officers are "managers of other people's money,"23 they 
lack the incentive to look after the money with the same care as they would with their own 
money. In widely-held companies, therefore, governance devices-most notably the board 
of directors-monitor corporate officers. 
At controlled companies, the controlling shareholder has the ability and incentive to 
police management effectively because of its large equity stake. 24 But the controller can 
also use its voting clout to self-deal and extract private benefits of control. 25 Controllers 
can, for example, cause the controlled company to enter into transactions on terms that 
favor them, such as compensation arrangements that overpay them. They can also acquire 
20. EDWARD KAMONJOH, CONTROLLED COMPANIES IN THE STANDARD & POOR'S 1500: A FOLLOW-UP 
REVlEW OF PERFORMANCE & RISK 15 (2016), https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/ 
2016/03/Controlled-Companies-lRRCI-2015-FINAL-3-16-16.pdf. 
21. For an in-depth comparison of the nature of the agency problem in controlled and widely-held firms, 
see Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1263, 1281-82 (2009) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Hamdani, The Elusive Quest]. 
22. See id. (arguing that, in widely-held firms, "the fundamental concern that governance arrangements 
need to address is management's potential to behave opportunistically at the expense of shareholders"); Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312-13 (1976) (arguing that the separation between ownership and control creates 
incentives for managers to engage in self-interested behavior that reduces the firm's value). 
23. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith argued that "managers of other people's money" would never 
watch over this money with the "same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently 
watch over their own." 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEAL TH OF NATIONS 229 (J.M. Dent & Sons, 1963) (1776). 
24. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, The Elusive Quest, supra note 21, at 1281 (arguing that, in controlled firms, 
"controlling shareholders commonly have both the effective means to monitor management and the incentives to 
do so"); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative 
Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1651 (2006) ("Because she holds a large equity stake, a controlling 
shareholder is more likely to have the incentive either to monitor managers effectively or to manage the company 
itself and, because of proximity and lower information costs, may be able to catch problems earlier."). 
25. See Jn re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, 
at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) ("A controlling stockholder occupies a uniquely advantageous position for 
extracting differential benefits from the corporation at the expense of minority stockholders."). For a review of 
different methods of extracting private benefits of control, see Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffery N. Gordon, Controlling 
Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003), which identifies three methods: taking from the 
firm's ongoing earnings, selling control, and freezing out the minority shareholders. 
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equity at below-market prices from either the firm or other shareholders in a freezeout 
transaction. Governance devices at controlled companies, therefore, protect the public 
shareholders vis-a-vis the controlling shareholder. 
In the United States, the traditional approach for constraining the controller's ability 
to extract private benefits is to encourage board processes that give a strong hand to 
independent directors.26 To be clear, "independence" is measured in different ways 
depending on the conflict at hand. 27 In the special litigation committee context, for 
example, where independent directors must evaluate the merits of a lawsuit against the 
company's officers or fellow directors, "independence" is tested as independence from the 
interested officers or directors. 28 In the context of a transaction between a controller and 
the controlled company, "independence" means independent from the controller.29 
Delaware courts, in particular, have strengthened the appeal of independent directors 
by giving credit to conflicted transactions that were vetted and approved by a special 
committee comprised of independent directors. Under Delaware law, controlling 
shareholders are normally re~uired to prove the intrinsic fairness of their transactions with 
the companies they control. 3 If, however, the interested transaction was negotiated and 
approved by an independent special committee, the burden of proving the deal's fairness 
shifts to the plaintiffs. 31 Recently, in 2014, the Delaware Supreme Court added a new 
doctrinal twist. In Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., the court held that a freezeout merger 
initiated by a controlling shareholder that is conditioned on approval by both an 
independent special committee and a majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote should be 
26. See In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 529-30 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("The premise that independent 
directors with the right incentives can play an effective role on behalf of minority investors is one shared by 
respected scholars sincerely concerned with protecting minority investors from unfair treatment by controlling 
stockholders."). But some scholars have voiced concerns that independent directors, as they are currently defined, 
will inevitably be conflicted in representing the minority's interests. For recent examples of this literature, see, 
for instance, Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, and Maria Gutierrez & Maribel Saez, 
Deconstructing Independent Directors, 13 J. CORP. L. STUD. 63 (2013). 
27. For a careful and extensive discussion of how Delaware's approach to "independence" varies with 
context, see generally Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 464-84. 
28. See James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination 
of Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1983) (describing independence 
as "judged by objective evidence regarding the [special litigation] committee members' relationship to the 
defendants and the misconduct underlying the suit"). 
29. See Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation, supra note 6, at 507 (asking "[d]oes the average 
independent director have sufficient integrity, information, and motivation to resist overreaching by a majority 
stockholder?"). 
30. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642 (Del. 2014). 
31. Id. Until recently, it was unclear whether Delaware courts would give more credit to independent 
shareholder approval as a cleansing device outside of the freezeout context. Some earlier opinions had applied 
the business judgment rule to non-merger transactions approved by a special committee of independent directors, 
see Friedman v. Dolan, C.A. No. 9425-VCN, 2015 WL 4040806, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (controller 
compensation); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. S 'holders Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 587 (Del. Ch. 2007) (consulting agreement 
with controller), but more recent decisions generally endorse the view that the same standard of judicial review 
should apply to the different mechanisms by which controllers can extract private benefits of control. See, e.g., In 
re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *20-30 (Del. 
Ch. Jan. 25, 2016) (advisory services agreements with entities affiliated with controller); In re Martha Stewart 
Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11202-VCS, 2017 WL 3568089, at *18 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 
2017) (one-sided controlling shareholder transaction involving allegations of disparate consideration). 
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reviewed under the highly deferential business judgement standard. 32 The court reasoned 
that this deal structure would afford minority shareholders the same robust protections that 
are built into an arms-length merger process, so the same standard of review should 
apply.33 
Delaware courts thus place great faith in the ability of independent directors to bargain 
meaningfully with the controlling shareholder. Whether ostensibly independent directors 
can serve this role depends on what exactly constitutes "independence." I now turn to this 
question. 
B. Who is Independent? 
According to the conventional understanding, independent directors are directors 
without substantial prior or ongoing professional or personal connections to the controlling 
shareholder.34 This is the marker of"independence" that the Delaware courts have mostly 
focused on. 35 Of course, the absence of ties to the controller does not guarantee 
independence in fact. A broad scholarly debate has emerged about other mechanisms that 
might influence directors' ability to be objective, including the controlling shareholder's 
power over director retention and termination, psychological or norm-based constraints, 
and reputational penalties. 
1. Past and Ongoing Relationships 
Delaware law frames the independence inquiry as a simple question: whether 
"through J'ersonal or other relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling 
person."3 Although seemingly straightforward, Delaware's conception of disqualifying 
relationships is in fact highly contextual, deliberately infused with an air of"I know it when 
I see it" mushiness. 37 Still, broad patterns emerge. 
For example, the mere fact that the controlling shareholder elected a director to the 
32. M & F Worldwide, 88 A.3d at 644. 
33. See id. (explaining that "where the controller irrevocably and publicly disables itself from using its 
control to dictate the outcome of the negotiations and the shareholder vote [by employing both procedural 
protections], the controlled merger then acquires the shareholder-protective characteristics of third-party, arm's-
length mergers, which are reviewed under the business judgment standard"). 
34. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, at 1274 (defining independent 
directors as "directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than their service on the board"); 
cf Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 453 ("The conventional corporate governance understanding of 'independence' 
translates roughly as 'lack of ties to the corporation."'). 
35. Usha Rodrigues has observed that, under Delaware's approach, "the independence of directors is 
evaluated not just in terms of their lack of ties with the acquirer, but also in terms of their behavior." Rodrigues, 
supra note 5, at 478. 
36. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984). 
37. See Jn re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 941 (Del. Ch. 2003) (explaining that "[b]y 
taking into account all circumstances, the Delaware approach undoubtedly results in some level of indeterminacy, 
but with the compensating benefit that independence determinations are tailored to the precise situation at issue"); 
Charles M. Elson, Whar's Wrong with Executive Compensation, 81 HARV. Bus. REV. 68, 68 (2003) (quoting 
former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. Norman Veasey, as saying that "[w]e can't set down 
rules for independence ... But we didn'tjust fall off the turnip truck, you know. We can tell whether somebody 
is acting independently or not"). 
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board is insufficient to raise doubts about the director's independence. 38 As the Delaware 
Supreme Court wryly explained in Aronson v. Lewis, "[t]hat is the usual way a person 
becomes a corporate director."39 Friendship or social ties are treated much in the same way. 
Mere allegations that "directors are friendly with [or] travel in the same social circles" as 
the controller are not usually enough to taint a director's independence.40 An extremely 
"close" relationship, such as a friendship that lasted for more than 50 years, could however 
be disqualifying. 41 
Familial relationships, on the other hand, will normally discredit a director's 
independence. In Mize! v. Connelly, for instance, the Delaware Chancery Court did not 
believe that a director could impartially consider a lawsuit adverse to his grandfather's 
interests, calling the grandfather-grandson relationship one of"great consequence."42 But 
courts have not treated family ties with perfect consistency either. In Seibert v. Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc., the Chancery Court determined that a director was independent even 
though the interested party was his cousin. 43 
Many independence cases involve business dealings, such as fees from consulting or 
legal services. Delaware judges have recognized that when a controlling shareholder has 
the power to decide whether a director "continues to receive a benefit," such as fees from 
professional services, there is reason to doubt the director's impartiality. 44 But this taint 
only exists if the benefit is material to the director given her actual economic 
circumstances.45 Thus, in In re MFW Shareholders Litigation, the Chancery Court found 
that the receipt of $100,000 in consulting fees did not call into question a director's 
independence, because she was a wealthy "banking big shot.'.46 In contrast, in In re The 
Limited, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, the Chancery Court concluded that annual 
consulting fees of $150,000 compromised the independence of a director who worked as a 
university official.47 Given the university official's modest existing wealth, it was 
38. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. 
39. Id. 
40. In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 11202-VCS, 2017 WL 
3568089, at *19 (Del. Ch. Aug. 18, 2017). 
41. Del. Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund v. Sanchez, 124 A.3d 1017, 1023 (Del. 2015) (concluding that a fifty-year 
friendship with the interested party creates a reasonable doubt as to a director's independence); see also Sandys 
v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 130 (Del. 2016) (noting that co-ownership of the private airplane with the controlling 
shareholder "signaled an extremely close, personal bond" that provides reason to doubt the director's 
independence). 
42. Mize! v. Connelly, No. CIV.A. 16638, 1999 WL 550369, at *4 (Del. Ch. July 22, 1999). 
43. Seibert v. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., No. CIV.A. 6639, 1984 WL 21874, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 5, 
1984). 
44. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
45. See id. ("The key issue is not simply ... whether another person or entity has the ability to take some 
benefit away from a particular director, but whether the possibility of gaining some benefit or the fear of losing a 
benefit is likely to be of such importance to that director that it is reasonable for the Court to question whether 
valid business judgment or selfish considerations animated that director's vote on the challenged transaction."); 
In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 509-10 (Del. Ch. 2013) (noting that "[c]onsistent with the overarching 
requirement that any disqualifying tie be material, the simple fact that there are some financial ties between the 
interested party and the director is not disqualifying," and "it is necessary to look to the financial circumstances 
of the director in question to determine materiality"). 
46. Jn re MFW S 'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 511-12 n.54. 
47. In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC, 2002 WL 537692, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 
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reasonable to infer that he "was 'beholden' to [the company's CEO] because of a desire to 
continue with those consulting services."48 
To be sure, controlling shareholders can have the power to benefit a director in the 
future even if they have had no relationships with each other in the past. Consider, for 
example, a director who is a partner in a law firm that has never provided services to the 
controller. The controller or the companies under its control can still be the director's future 
clients. Delaware courts, however, have been reluctant to conclude that the prospect of 
future benefits, without more, can compromise independence. In In re MFW Shareholders 
Litigation, one member of the special committee that negotiated and approved the freezeout 
transaction, Viet Dinh, subsequently joined the board of another company controlled by 
the same controller, but the court nevertheless found that Dinh was independent. 49 Then-
Chancellor Strine explained: 
IfDinh's [subsequent] directorship ... were to be relevant to his independence 
at the time of the MFW transaction, the plaintiffs would need to provide record 
evidence creating a triable issue of fact that he was offered the directorship before 
the special committee approved the deal, or that it had at least been discussed 
with him before this time. 50 
Plainly, what Strine was looking for is evidence that the second directorship was used as a 
bribe. Applying this standard, in In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, 
the Chancery Court found a director potentially lacking in independence because he 
solicited a post-deal consulting engagement with the controlled company during the 
freezeout negotiations. 51 
In sum, Delaware's approach to independence is unquestionably nuanced, probing 
deeply into relationships to determine if the director is capable of truly independent 
judgment. But it is also starkly lopsided. It concentrates on negative incentives, such as the 
prospect of retribution from the controller or the prospect of losing a lucrative stream of 
income, while all but ignoring positive ones, such as the prospect of reward. 
2. The Controller's Power over Director Retention and Termination 
In the scholarly literature, the absence of disqualifying ties to the controlling 
shareholder is just the first criterion. Other mechanisms can also create incentives for 
director behavior. 
Some commentators, for example, argue that controlling shareholders' decisive 
influence over director re-election and termination can undermine directors' impartiality. 52 
27, 2002). 
48. Id. at *6-7; see also In re Ply Gem Indus., Inc. S'holders Litig., No. ClV.A. 15779-NC, 2001 WL 
755133, at *8 (Del. Ch. June 26, 2001) (finding that a director's receipt of $1 million in legal fees raised a 
reasonable doubt as to his independence where the facts showed that "his was a small law firm"). 
49. In re MFW S 'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 513, affd sub nom. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 
635, 648 (Del. 2014). 
50. Id. at 513 n.65. 
51. In re Orchard Enter., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 21, 26 (Del. Ch. 2014). 
52. For an excellent recent article arguing that controlling shareholders' decisive power to appoint and 
terminate independent directors undermine the effectiveness of those directors' oversight, see Bebchuk & 
Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6. Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have made a similar point in the 
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It is well known that corporate directorships are coveted. After all, the median annual 
director compensation of Russell 3000 companies in 2017 is $203,380. 53 In addition to 
income, there are often lavish perks; for example, General Motors' directors can use a new 
company car every six months and every year after retirement. 54 Board experience can also 
lead to business contacts and help executives advance in their own careers. Indeed, Steven 
Boivie and his co-authors find that a board seat im£roves executives' likelihood of being 
promoted to CEO and boosts their subsequent pay. 5 
Controlling shareholders possess a formidable weapon to distort the incentives of 
directors who wish to stay on the board. As Lucian Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani have 
observed, "[ d]irectors at firms with controlling shareholders-including independent 
directors--cannot be elected or reelected following their initial term-unless the 
controlling shareholder supports their candidacies. Nor will they sta~ in office once the 
controlling shareholder decides to end their service on the board." 6 To put this point 
bluntly, directors depend on controllers for their board seats. As a result, they have 
substantial incentives to go along with the controllers' proposals. 
As a theoretical matter, the controlling shareholder's power to remove an 
uncooperative director from the board is merely a manifestation of her power to withdraw 
a benefit that the director is currently getting. As the previous section explained, Delaware 
decisions have held that a director's independence could be tainted by the fear that the 
controller would withdraw an ongoing business benefit in retribution. 57 But Delaware 
courts have firmly refused to hold that a director's independence could be similarly 
compromised by the fear that the controller would take away the directorship-unless the 
controller has explicitly threatened to do so. 58 At the same time, Delaware judges worry 
that the power imbalances could create an inherently coercive environment: that is, "when 
executive pay context, arguing that the CEO's influence over director nominations prevents directors from 
bargaining effectively with the CEO over pay. See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT 
PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 25-27 (2004). 
53. EY CTR. FOR BD. MATTERS, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BY THE NUMBERS 1 (2017), 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-cgbtn-monthly-print-version-sept-2017/ 
$FILE/ey-cgbtn-month ly-print-version-sept-2017. pdf. 
54. Theo Francis & Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Directors' Pay Ratchets Higher as Risks Grow, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/corporate-directors-pay-ratchets-higher-as-risks-grow-
1456279452. 
55. See generally Steven Boivie et al., Come Aboard! Exploring the Effects of Directorships in the 
Executive Labor Market, 59 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1681 (2016); see also Joann S. Lublin, Grooming Top Executives 
Includes Outside Board Experience, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 29, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/grooming-
top-executives-includes-outside-board-experience-1459243802 (observing that "external directorships have 
become a key ingredient of executive-development efforts"). 
56. Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, at 1287. 
57. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. 
58. See Jn re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *28 n.15 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (noting that "controlling stockholder status does not, standing alone, give rise to 
concern," but "when controllers actually make retributive threats, that fact is evidence of unfair dealing"); Kahn 
v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) (holding that the special committee's ability to 
negotiate effectively was compromised by threats from the controlling shareholder); cf Jn re Ezcorp Inc. 
Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *41-42 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 
2016) (citing retributive behavior by the controlling shareholder as a reason to doubt a director's ability to 
consider a litigation demand). 
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an 800-pound gorilla[, the controlling shareholder] wants the rest of the bananas, little 
chimpanzees, like independent directors and minority stockholders, cannot be expected to 
stand in the way."59 
Reconciling these seemingly contradictory positions is a Herculean task. At bottom, 
the likely answer to the tangle is Chief Justice Strine's statement that the fact "[t]hat a 
director sits on a controlled company board is not, and cannot of course, be determinative 
of director independence . . . as that would make the question of independence 
tautological."60 Whatever its reality, the claim that directors in controlled companies could 
be structurally or per se biased has been emphatically rejected by the Delaware courts. 61 
3. "Boardroom Atmosphere" and Psychological Factors 
Another strand of scholarship focuses on social and psychological factors that could 
subtly undercut independence. 62 Commentators have identified at least three forms of 
cognitive bias. 
First, a director's judgment may be tainted by ingroup bias, the unconscious tendency 
to "evaluate one's own groups more positively in relation to other groups."63 As James 
Cox and Harry Munsinger lamented in their classic article on director bias, "the boards of 
American corporations continue to be distinguished by their homogeneity."64 With a 
median age of 63,65 directors today are predominantly white males with experiences as 
CEOs or executive officers of other corporations. 66 Cox and Munsinger explained that the 
59. Strine, The inescapably Empirical Foundation, supra note 6, at 509. Recent Delaware decisions, 
however, have shown less concern with the specter of coercion present in controlling shareholder relationships. 
See, e.g., Jn re CNX Gas Corp. S'holders Litig., 4 A.3d 397, 413 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("Post-Lynch experience shows 
that special committees can negotiate effectively with controllers and ... reject squeeze-out proposals."); Jn re 
Pure Res., Inc. S 'holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 436 n.17 (Del. Ch. 2002) (describing concerns about the integrity 
of the special committee process as "premised on a less trusting view of independent directors"). 
60. Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, 133 (Del. 2016). 
61. Chief Justice Strine has expressly made this point to explain Delaware courts' reluctance to find that 
director independence can be compromised by structural realities. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative impact? Some 
Early Reflections on the Corporation Law implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 Bus. LAW. 1371, 1378-79 
(2002) (describing judges' concern that, if the presumption of independence can be lightly pierced, "in any 
scenario in which the role of independent directors has been declared most useful-such as the approval of an 
interested transaction or a takeover fight---the independent directors simply do not exist"). 
62. For a classic account of this problem, see James D. Cox & Hany L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: 
Psychological Foundations and Legal implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 
(1985). For a more recent article arguing that courts have not responded to social and psychological bias in a 
consistent manner, see Julian Velasco, Strnctural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 
821 (2004). For a skeptical discussion of these factors, see Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of 
the Board in Derivative Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALI Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAW. 503, 
534-35 (1989) (arguing that the structural bias argument is unconvincing because it presumes that independent 
directors are more willing to risk financial income and reputational harm than question insider misbehavior). 
63. Christopher L. Aberson et al., lngroup Bias and Self-Esteem: A Meta-Analysis, 4 PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 157, 157 (2000). 
64. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 62, at 105. 
· 65. See Jon Lukomnik, Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Feb. 9, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/02/09/board-refreshment-
trends-at-sp-1500-firms. 
66. See id. (reporting that women hold 17.8% of S&P 1500 board seats and minorities hold just over 10%); 
Stephen Foley et al., US Board Composition: Male, Stale and Frail?, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2016), 
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cultural and socioeconomic similarities among directors and managers make them 
especially prone to ingroup bias. 67 Directors tend to approach their task "with a deep 
personal understanding of, and respect for, the burdens of management."68 An executive 
or former executive, for example, is likely to have formed a belief that management should 
have the ability to implement their business ideas in the manner that they see fit-that it is 
even counterproductive for management to spend a great deal of time responding to issues 
raised by shareholders or the board. As a director, then, the executive or former executive 
will tend to defer to management even when she has a different view. 
Second, it is often in a director's self-interest to play by the rule "there but for the 
grace of God go I. " 69 Directors may show favoritism to other directors because this type 
of behavior benefits directors indirectly as a class. 70 This self-interest extends to decisions 
that favor corporate officers as well. 71 Executives serving as directors have an incentive to 
favor management in order to encourage similar treatment on their own boards. Consider, 
for example, decisions about executive compensation. By approving generous pay 
arrangements for other corporate officers, executives contribute to a business environment 
that is conducive to better pay for themselves. 
Finally, bias might result from what Warren Buffett calls the "boardroom 
atmosphere."72 Except perhaps in times of crisis, directors are expected to be "team 
players" who "get along" with each other and with the firm's executives. 73 In the 
boardroom, some things are just not done. Buffett offers this example: it is "almost 
impossible," he explains, for a director "to question a proposed acquisition that has been 
endorsed by the CEO, particularly when his inside staff and outside advisors are present 
and unanimously support his decision. (They wouldn't be in the room if they didn't.)."74 
In this form, bias exists because unspoken social norms, which prize collegiality and 
consent over conflict, dictate the actual course of behavior in board meetings. 
4. Risk to Reputation 
Finally, reputation plays an important role in directors' incentive calculus. Corporate 
https://ig.ft.com/sites/us-board-diversity (finding that U.S. boards are "maier, staler and frailer" than European 
boards); Joann S. Lublin, This ls Why Corporate Boards Aren't More Diverse, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 15, 2014), 
https ://biogs. wsj .com/atwork/2014/04/15/this-is-why-corporate-boards-arent-more-diverse (reporting that 
around 67% of male directors, 65% of white directors, 54% of minority directors, and 45% of female directors 
have experience as CEOs or chief financial officers). 
67. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 62, at 105--07. 
68. id. at 106. 
69. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). 
70. See Velasco, supra note 62, at 856--57 (describing one paradigm of structural bias as an "implicit 
conspiracy" that causes independent directors to show favoritism for management and other directors because 
they will indirectly benefit from promoting those groups' interests). 
71. See id. 
72. Letter from Warren Buffett, Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders 16 (Feb. 21, 2003), 
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf. 
73. JONA THAN R. MACEY, CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN 61-62 (2008); 
accord Cox & Munsinger, supra note 62, at 91 (noting that boardroom norms disfavor "[i]ndividuals who are 
quarrelsome, disagreeable, or rigid"). 
74. Letter from Warren Buffett, supra note 72, at 17. 
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directors have been described as the "most reputationally sensitive people in the world."75 
On the traditional account, reputational concerns enhance independence in fact. As Eugene 
Fama and Michael Jensen have argued, independent directors' desire to join other boards 
should make them tougher monitors of management in order to "develop reputations as 
experts in decision control."76 A reputation for director talent, the argument goes, will 
translate into more directorship opportunities. Association with a corporate scandal can 
also be embarrassing to directors and disrupt other aspects of their careers, including their 
full-time jobs.77 Presumably most directors would not be willing to sacrifice the value of 
their human capital in order to appease a controlling shareholder. 78 
Bebchuk and Jesse Fried have suggested an alternative account. They contend that 
reputational concerns only deter independent directors from severe malfeasance or actions 
that starkly empower the management at the expense of other shareholders, such as an 
egregious pay arrangement. 79 In the more common situation involving underperformance, 
which is often the result of a complicated set of events, there is little or no reputational 
penalty. 80 In addition, although board members vote individually on corporate decisions, 
their actions are recorded as a group, making it hard for public shareholders to reward or 
discipline a particular director for her contributions. 81 Consistent with this observation, 
75. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1812 (2001) (quoting 
corporate governance expert Nell Minow). 
76. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 315 
(1983). 
77. For example, following the Enron scandal, several of Enron's former directors resigned from their 
directorships at other corporations. See Brooke A. Masters, Enron 's Quiet Outages Uncharged in the Fraud, 
Directors Settled, Resigned, Lay Low, WASH. POST (June 2, 2006), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
archive/business/2006/06/02/enrons-quiet-outages-span-classbankheaduncharged-in-the-fraud-directors-settled-
resigned-lay-lowspan/a3b9fc3f-5e6b-4833-be82-c85b 7 d66cc8 l /?noredirect=on&utm _ term=.08a6d0d099a6; 
MACEY, supra note 73, at 208 (noting that the careers ofEnron's fonner directors "virtually ended when their weak 
oversight of Enron was revealed"). But other commentators have argued that directors rarely suffer labor market 
consequences, even when they fail to prevent egregious conduct. For instance, Steven Davidoff Solomon has 
observed that "many of the directors of Lehman and Bear Steams continue to serve on other boards, and one Lehman 
director, Jerry A. Grundhofer, has apparently been so chastened about the liability issue surrounding large banks that 
he is serving on the Citigroup board." Steven Davidoff Solomon, Despite Worries, Serving at the Top Carries Little 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (June 7, 2011 ), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despite-worries-serving-at-
the-top-carries-little-risk. 
78. See Dooley & Veasey, supra note 62, at 534-35 (expressing skepticism that "outside directors generally 
are more willing to risk reputation and future income than they are to risk the social embarrassment of calling a 
colleague to account"); Jn re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528-29 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing the 
Delaware Supreme Court's belief that "directors have a more self-protective interest in retaining their reputations 
as faithful, diligent fiduciaries") (citing Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 
A.2d 1040, 1052 (Del. 2004)). 
79. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52, at 35-36. 
80. See id. Ronald Gilson and Reinier Kraakman have also expressed this skepticism, calling the idea that 
the market will punish underperforming directors a "myth" akin to "directorial noblesse." Ronald Gilson & 
Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 
863, 875 (1991). 
81. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive 
Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2002) (arguing that "the signal provided by independent directorships 
is likely to be quite noisy"). A recent study by Reena Aggarwal and her co-authors found that directors who 
receive low shareholder support in elections-which can be seen as a director-specific assessment--do suffer 
negative consequences, including a reduction in directorships at other firms. See generally Reena Aggarwal et al., 
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studies have found that proxy advisory firms frequently issue conflicting recommendations 
for a director who is up for election in multiple firms: proxy advisors would recommend 
that shareholders of firm A withhold their votes for the director because of poor 
performance but simultaneously recommend that shareholders in firm B vote for the 
director. 82 
Bebchuk and Fried also question whether a reputation for tough monitoring helps or 
hurts a director's prospects of securing directorships in other companies. 83 They argue that 
because CEOs heavily influence-and controlling shareholders control outright--<lirector 
selection, a reputation as a director who does not rock the boat will likely be more useful 
in obtaining additional board seats. 84 While this view has some intuitive appeal, the 
empirical evidence is decidedly mixed. 85 On the one hand, there is evidence that outside 
directors who take shareholder-friendly actions are rewarded. Studies have found, for 
example, that independent directors who opted out of state anti-takeover laws-laws that 
entrench management-observe an increase in the number of future board opportunities;86 
directors who fail to implement shareholder proposals are more likely to lose board seats 
at other firms; 87 and outside directors at highly-performing firms are more likely to gain 
additional directorships, at least under certain empirical models. 88 On the other hand, 
several papers have concluded that directors suffer only trivial labor market penalties for 
poor monitoring, even when a crisis erupts under their watch. Researchers have observed, 
for instance, that outside directors of firms that engaged in option backdating or that 
substantially underperformed their peers were no less successful than other directors at 
gaining future board seats. 89 
The Power of Shareholder Votes: Evidence from Uncontested Director Elections, J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming). 
82. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Reputation Penalties for Poor Monitoring of Executive Pay: Evidence from 
Option Backdating, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 118, 136 & n.30 (2012) [hereinafter Ertimur et al., Reputation Penalties] 
(finding no instances where the proxy adviser Institutional Shareholder Services (!SS) recommended withholding 
votes from a director at one firm because of the director's association with a different firm that was involved in 
option backdating, and reporting that !SS does not automatically carry over negative recommendations to a 
director's other boards except in the most egregious cases); Stephen Choi et al., Director Elections and the Role 
of Proxy Advisors, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 649, 686-87(2009) (finding no evidence that proxy advisers considered a 
director's performance on one board in issuing a recommendation for a different board). 
83. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52, at 36 (discussing how "a reputation for challenging CEO 
compensation is likely to be viewed as a minus, not as a plus, by other firms' nominating committees"). 
84. See id. 
85. For a summary of the empirical evidence, see Steven M. Davidoff et al., Do Outside Directors Face 
Labor Market Consequences? A Natural Experiment from the Financial Crisis, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 53, 61--63 
(2014). 
86. See Jeffrey L. Coles & Chun-Keung Hoi, New Evidence on the Market for Directors: Board 
Membership and Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 58 J. FIN. 197, 229 (2003). 
87. See Yonca Ertimur et al., Board of Directors' Responsiveness to Shareholders: Evidence from 
Shareholder Proposals, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 67 (2010). 
88. See, e.g., David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 
59 J. FIN. 2281, 2302 (2004) (finding statistically significant results only when using a lagged performance 
variable and stock returns). 
89. See, e.g., Davidoff et al., supra note 85, at 72 (finding no significant correlation between the 
performance of one firm associated with the outside director and the director's ability to obtain other board seats); 
Ertimur et al., Reputation Penalties, supra note 82, at 137 (finding that association with a firm involved with 
option backdating did not significantly affect other directorship opportunities); Christopher S. Armstrong, 
inelastic Labor Markets and Directors' Reputational Incentives, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
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* * * 
In this Part, I showed that "independence" in the standard Delawarean parlance 
reduces roughly to a lack of substantial past or ongoing connections to the controlling 
shareholder. The inquiry recognizes and responds to the concern that negative incentives 
may lead directors to favor controllers: the worry is that directors with lucrative ties to the 
controlling shareholder might be influenced by the fact that the controller can cut off those 
ties. Yet it all but ignores the fact that positive incentives-the prospect of future patronage 
from the controlling shareholder--can provide the same spur to appease. Attempts by 
corporate governance reformers to refine the markers of independence are similarly 
lopsided, identifying mostly sticks (the loss of a directorship, the risk of harm to reputation) 
but no carrots. 
Is the prospect of future patronage substantial enough to bear on the average 
independent director's ability to be impartial? To put the point more bluntly, is this conflict 
more than a mere theoretical danger? The answer turns in large part on another empirical 
question: do controlling shareholders reward cooperative directors? I now turn to this 
question. 
III. INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR REALITIES 
This Part presents my empirical results. After describing the data sources and 
methodology in Part III.A, I show in Part III.B that controlling shareholders re-appoint 
nominally independent directors to executive positions and directorships at other firms that 
they control. (In what follows, I will refer to these ties simply as "professional" ties). My 
results suggest that many nominally independent directors received opportunities from the 
controlling shareholder after acting to favor the controlling shareholder's interests. 
In Part III.C, I argue that the monolithic conception of controlling shareholders that 
pervades the jurisprudence and literature is too coarse to capture the complex ways in 
which controlling shareholders can undermine director independence. Building off of my 
empirical results, I offer a more nuanced taxonomy that theorizes how much and what kind 
of pressure a controlling shareholder can exert. The taxonomy divides controllers along 
two dimensions: the base of controlled entities and the concentration of decision-making 
authority. A given controller's power to incentivize director behavior depends on its mix 
of these attributes. 
A. Data Sources and Methodology 
I constructed a new database of nominally independent directors who vetted recent 
freezeouts of Delaware targets. I searched the Thomson Reuters Corporation's SDC 
Platinum database for all completed transactions that were coded as "acquisitions of 
remaining interest" or "going private"; were announced between January 1, 2000, and 
December 31, 2014; and in which the target was a Delaware corporation and the acquirer 
(or the ultimate parent of the acquirer) was a U.S. entity. I eliminated transactions where 
the acquirer held less than 35% of the target's voting shares when the transaction was 
FIN. REG. (July 13, 2017), https://corpgov. law.harvard.edu/2017 /07 /13/inelastic-labor-markets-and-directors-
reputational-incentives (finding that directors with poor stock returns over their tenure are more likely to lose 
their board seat, but they are also more likely to gain a seat on another, and often better, board). 
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announced (Delaware courts have deemed a shareholder with as little as a 35% holding to 
be a controlling shareholder90), as well as transactions that were actually one step of a two-
step acquisition by an outside third-party (because whether such transactions are "true" 
freezeouts is a gray area91 ). I also excluded transactions where the acquirer held 90% or 
more of the outstanding shares because such transactions can be executed as short-form 
mergers, which are treated differently by Delaware law. 92 Finally, I eliminated transactions 
where the target did not establish a special committee of independent directors to assess 
the offer. The final data includes 88 transactions. 
For each deal, I examined SEC filings to collect information on the special committee 
formed to review and negotiate the terms. The resulting data includes 222 nominally 
independent directors. I gathered information about board directorships and employment 
history for each director from the BoardEx database, news reports, and SEC filings of 
companies associated with the director. Using this information, I hand coded relational 
links among directors and controlling shareholders. With one exception, I identified 
instances where the nominally independent director either served on the board of another 
company controlled or dominated by the controlling shareholder or as an executive of such 
a company. The exception is Ronald Joseph, who was a director of Great American 
Financial Resources and whose son served as a director of another company controlled by 
Great American's controlling shareholder. I classified Joseph as having a professional tie 
to the controlling shareholder, but the major findings reported in this section remain 
unchanged if I exclude him from the analysis. 
To be clear, I looked at connections to the ultimate controlling person or entity, which 
is not necessarily the acquirer.93 While my data includes 88 deals, it includes only 77 
unique ultimate controlling shareholders because several freezeouts were executed by the 
same controlling entity. (For example, the Cox family completed a freezeout of both Cox 
Communications and Cox Radio during the sample time period). In four cases, I classified 
a person or entity as the ultimate controlling shareholder even though it held less than 35% 
of the acquirer's voting shares at the time of the freezeout, because the acquirer or Delaware 
courts treated it as the ultimate controlling shareholder: Leslie Wexner (The Limited's 
90. See, e.g., In re Cysive, Inc. S'holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 535, 551-53 (Del. Ch. 2003). In fact, the 
Delaware Chancery Court recently found it reasonably conceivable that Elon Musk, a 22.1 % stockholder of Tesla 
Motors, Inc., was a controlling shareholder in light of "his domination of the Board ... against the backdrop of 
his extraordinary influence within the Company generally, the Board level conflicts that diminished the Board's 
resistance to Musk's influence, and the Company's and Musk's own acknowledgements of his outsized 
influence." See In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 12711-VCS, 2018 WL 1560293, at *2, *19 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2018). 
91. See Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 
1354, 1360 (1978) (explaining that "[a]lthough the tag-end merger appears to be an example of self-dealing by 
the majority stockholders, it is only superficially of that class"). 
92. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001); see generally Glassman v. Unocal Exp!. Corp., 777 A.2d 242 
(Del. 2001). 
93. Both Delaware courts and the United States Supreme Court have looked beyond the formal corporate 
entities behind the transaction to the persons or entities "who wield ... control in substance." In re Ezcorp Inc. 
Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at *9, *18-21 (Del. Ch. Jan. 
25, 2016) (holding that a person could owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders when he controlled a 
corporation through intervening entities); accord S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 491-92 (1919) (holding 
that a firm that exercised control through a subsidiary entity could owe fiduciary duties to the controlled 
company's minority shareholders). 
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freezeout of Intimate Brands);94 John Malone (Liberty Media International's freezeout of 
UnitedGlobalCom);95 Bennett LeBow (Vector Group's freezeout of New Valley);96 and 
the Lindner family (American Financial Group's freezeout of Great American Financial 
Resources). 97 
Finally, using SEC filings, I classified ultimate controlling shareholders along two 
dimensions. First, I categorized each controlling shareholder as either an individual person, 
a family group, an investment manager,98 or a widely-held corporation. Second, among 
controlling shareholders that are persons or family groups, I identified those that have 
controlled more than one publicly-traded company between 1993 and 2017. I excluded 
controlling shareholders that are investment managers from this classification because 
investment managers typically acquire attributes of control through large but non -
controlling stakes (the hedge fund model) or by taking companies private (the private 
equity model).99 The purpose of this second classification is to identify controlling 
shareholders who maintain operational control of a portfolio of companies, and it is well 
known that private equity firms often function as repeat players in the market for 
operational control in this way. 100 I also excluded controlling shareholders that are widely-
94. See In re The Limited, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. CIV.A. 17148-NC,2002 WL 537692, at *l, *5 & n.33 
(Del. Ch. Mar. 27, 2002) (suggesting that Leslie Wexner controlled The Limited 's board because of his 25% 
holding coupled with "his position, as chairman, chief executive officer, and director"). At the time of The 
Limited's fteezeout of Intimate Brands, Wexner and the entities subject to his fiduciary duties as trustee held 
approximately 24% of The Limited's outstanding shares. See The Limited, Inc., Amendment No. 26 (Schedule 
130/A), at 12-13 (Nov. 3, 2004). 
95. See Liberty Media Int'!, Inc., Information Statement (Exhibit 99.l to Form I0-12G/A) (May 28, 2004) 
("By virtue of Mr. Malone's [29%] voting power in our company as well as his positions as our Chairman of the 
Board, President and Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Malone may be deemed to control our operations."). At the 
time of Liberty Media lntemational's fteezeout of UnitedGlobalCom, John Malone controlled approximately 
33% of Liberty Media Intemational's voting power. Liberty Media Int'!, Inc., Amendment No. 2 (Schedule 
130/A), at 6 (Jan. 19, 2005). 
96. See Vector Grp. Ltd., Definitive Proxy Statement Relating to Merger or Acquisition (Schedule .14A), 
at 6 (Nov. 7, 2005) (describing Bennett LeBow's "controlling interest in Vector"). At the time of Vector Group's 
fteezeout of New Valley, LeBow held approximately 33.4% of Vector Group's outstanding shares. Id. at 4. 
97. See Am. Fin. Grp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 19 (Mar. 1, 2007) ("[C]ertain members of the 
Lindner family have the ability to exercise significant influence over AFG's management, including over matters 
requiring shareholder approval."). At the time of American Financial Group's fteezeout of Great American 
Financial Resources, the Lindner family members held approximately 32.6% of Vector Group's outstanding 
shares. See id. 
98. I drew on John Morley's work for my definition of investment managers. In his article, The Separation 
of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, Morley argues that investment 
funds are characterized by the separation of funds and managers. See John Morley, The Separation of Funds and 
Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1238-40 (2014). As a 
practical matter, investment managers can overlap with the other three categories because investment 
management companies can be controlled by a single person, controlled by a family, or widely held (for instance, 
the hedge fund ESL Investments, Inc. is controlled by a single person, Edward Lampert). For present purposes, I 
coded controllers that manage investment funds as investment managers even if they fall under one of the other 
categories as well to focus on those controllers' status as repeat players in the market for corporate control or 
influence. 
99. See Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder Activism by Hedge 
Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 58-60 (2011) (comparing the business models ofhedge funds and private equity firms). 
100. See, e.g., Ronald W. Masulis & Randall S. Thomas, Does Private Equity Create Wealth? The Effects 
of Private Equity and Derivatives on Corporate Governance, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 219, 222-23 (2009) (explaining 
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held companies from this second classification because they are, by definition, a part of a 
family of public companies (at a minimum, the family consists of the widely-held 
controller and the public subsidiary it froze out). 
There are important limitations to my data, particularly as related to my focus on 
freezeouts and certain types of relationships. I limited the study to directors who were 
tasked with reviewing and negotiating freezeout transactions. The freezeout data offers a 
conservative picture of independence-that is, a vantage point on who is labelled an 
"independent" director when the stakes are high and litigation is nearly inevitable. So any 
evidence that directors who are appointed to negotiate freezeouts have other relationships 
with the controlling shareholders would be particularly suggestive. 
Additionally, out of an abundance of caution, I chose to focus exclusively on 
connections routinely reported in public databases and filings: directorships and senior 
executive positions in, for the most part, public companies. Controlling shareholders can 
benefit directors in a myriad of other, less visible ways, including appointing them to senior 
positions at privately-held companies. 101 I tried to mitigate this concern by studying each 
director's biography in SEC filings, which sometimes provide information on a director's 
employment at private firms. However, given these unavoidable data constraints, the full 
list of controller-independent director business dealings is almost certainly much longer. 
B. Controller-Independent Director Ties 
Table 1 shows the incidence of nominally independent directors who have multiple 
professional connections to the controlling shareholder. At the highest level, Table 1 shows 
that 20.3% of all directors in the data (45 of 222) have served as a director or a senior 
executive in at least one other company controlled or dominated by the controlling 
shareholder, and 2.3% (5 of 222) have ties to at least three other companies. This basic 
finding calls into question the familiar trope that directors who are labelled "independent" 
have no relationship to the controlling shareholder other than their service on the board. 102 
The special committee that approved the 2011 M&F Worldwide deal typifies the 
kinds of connections in the sample. M&F Worldwide formed a special committee of four 
nominally independent directors to negotiate and review the offer from MacAndrews & 
Forbes and its controlling shareholder, Ronald Perelman. Just three months after the deal 
closed, the chairman of the special committee, Paul Meister, was invited to be an 
independent director of Scientific Games, which at the time was 34.2% owned by 
Perelman. Meister also subsequently became the president of MacAndrews & Forbes in 
2014 and joined the boards of two other Perelman-controlled companies, vTv Therapeutics 
that private equity firms typically control their portfolio companies' operations through control of their boards of 
directors); Jn re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing venture capital firms as 
repeat players). 
101. Other scholars have discussed the limited available data on private firms. See, e.g., Robert J. Jackson, 
Jr., Private Equity and Executive Compensation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 638, 647 (2013); Robert Anderson IV, The 
Delaware Trap: An Empirical Analysis of Incorporation Decisions, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 657, 661 (2018). 
102. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, at 1274 (defining independent directors 
as "directors who have no ties to the controller or the company other than their service on the board"); Marcel 
Kahan & Edward Rock, When the Government is the Controlling Shareholder: Implications for Delaware, 89 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 409, 414 (2010) (describing directors who "work for the controlling shareholder or have other 
business relationships with the controlling shareholder" as non-independent). 
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and Revlon, Inc. 103 Meister's path is not unique: as I mentioned earlier, Viet Dinh, another 
special committee member, became an independent director of Revlon in June 2012, less 
than a year after the freezeout. In 2017, Dinh left Revlon to join the Scientific Games board. 
A third special committee member, Carl Webb, previously served as the president, chief 
operating officer and director of several Perelman-controlled entities (notably entities 
associated with First Nationwide Bank) between 1988 and 2002. 104 
I 03. Because of his role as president of MacAndrews & Forbes, Meister was not deemed an independent 
director ofvTv Therapeutics or Revlon. See vTv Therapeutics Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), 
at 11(Mar.24, 2016); Revlon, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at S-ii (Apr. 29, 2016). 
104. In the ensuing litigation over the MFW freezeout, minority shareholders challenged the special 
committee's independence, citing Dinh's and Webb's relationships to Perelman. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 
A.3d 496, 512-14 (Del. Ch. 2013), aff'd sub nom. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). The 
Delaware Chancery Court ruled that the ties were insufficient to call into question the special committee's 
independence, id., and the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. Kahn, 88 A.3d at 647-48. The plaintiffs did not 
challenge Meister's independence perhaps because Meister's connections to other Perelman-affiliated entities 
were only formed after the MFW freezeout closed. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 509. 
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Table 1. Incidence of independent (special committee) directors with professional ties 
n At least one At least 3 
other other 
professional professional 
tie ties 
All special committee directors 222 45 (20.3%) 5 (2.3%) 
Directors by controlling shareholder 
characteristics 1: 
Single natural person 85 23 (27.1%) 4 (4.7%) 
Widely-held company 66 14 (21.2%) 1 (1.5%) 
Family group 41 4 (9.8%) 0 
Investment manager 32 4 (12.5%) 0 
Controlling shareholder controlled 
multiple public companies and is a2 : 
Single natural person 50 22 (44.0%) 4 (8.0%) 
Family group 14 4 (28.6%) 0 
1. Two directors, Charles Crocco Jr. and Viet Dinh, served as special committee members for two 
freezeouts in the sample. Crocco Jr. was a member of the special committee that negotiated First Banks's 
freezeout of First Banks America and Anthony Gumbiner's freezeout of the Hallwood Group. Dinh was 
a member of the special committee that negotiated JDS Capital Management's freezeout of Orchard 
Enterprises and Ronald Perelman's freezeout of M&F Worldwide. Because these deals involve 
controlling shareholders with different attributes, Crocco and Dinh are counted twice. 
2. For the reasons discussed in Part Ill.A, widely-held companies and investment manager controllers were 
not categorized by the number of public companies under their control. 
With respect to controlling shareholder type, Table 1 shows that independent directors 
on boards controlled by a single natural person are most likely to have professional ties to 
other companies controlled or dominated by the controlling shareholder. Twenty-three of 
85 directors in that subset, or 27 .1 %, have repeat relationships of this sort. Among 
independent directors on boards controlled by a widely-held corporation, 21.2% (14 of66) 
have professional ties with at least one other controlled company. This result reflects the 
reality that directors of subsidiaries sometimes join the boards of the widely-held parent 
corporations once the subsidiary is taken private. Among the 32 independent directors on 
boards controlled by an investment manager, only four have professional ties to at least 
one other controlled company. This figure is likely an underestimate, however, because 
some investment managers invest mostly in private companies, and little is known about 
whom they hire as directors or executives. 105 Only four directors (9.8%) serving on boards 
105. See supra note 101. 
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controlled by a family group have professional ties to another controlled company. 
The lower half of Table 1 focuses on the subset of controlling shareholders that have 
controlled multiple public companies, which for convenience I will call "portfolio" 
controllers. In this subsample, the incidence of independent directors with professional ties 
to at least one other controlled company is notably higher than in the full sample-and 
quite high in absolute terms as well. Among independent directors on boards controlled by 
portfolio controllers who are individual persons in particular, 44% have repeat 
relationships. These results suggest that reappointment behavior may be a function of the 
controlling shareholder's power. Not all controlling shareholders can hire a director for a 
position at another entity; a controller who controls only one firm cannot offer a director a 
job at another firm. As I will explain in Part III.C, a controlling shareholder is likely to be 
more able to engage in reappointment behavior as the size of its portfolio increases. 
It is possible that these director-level results are skewed by the actions of just a few 
controlling shareholders, and the vast majority of controllers do not have other ties to the 
directors they label as independent. To explore this, I break down the controlling 
shareholders in the sample by reappointment behavior. The results are presented in Table 
2. I find that 36.4% of controlling shareholders (28 of77) have repeat relationships with at 
least one nominally independent director on their board, and 26% (20 of 77) have repeat 
relationships with at least half of the special committee members who negotiated the 
freezeout. This result confirms that the director-level outcomes are not driven by outliers. 
Moreover, like Table 1, Table 2 shows that reappointment behavior is more common 
among portfolio controllers. Strikingly, among portfolio controllers that are individual 
persons, 73.3% (11 of 15) have repeat relationships with at least half of the special 
committee that negotiated the deal. 
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Table 2. Controlling shareholders by reappointment behavior 
Repeat relationships with: 
n At least one Half or more 
director ofSC 1 
All controlling shareholders 77 28 (36.4%) 20 (26.0%) 
Controlling shareholder characteristics: 
Single natural person 29 14 (48.3%) 12 (41.4%) 
Widely-held company 23 7 (30.4%) 5 (21.7%) 
Family group 12 3 (25.0%) 1 (8.3%) 
Investment manager 13 4 (30.8%) 2 (15.4%) 
Controlling shareholder controlled 
multiple public companies and is a2: 
Single natural person 15 13 (86.7%) 11 (73.3%) 
Family group 4 3 (75.0%) 1 (25.0%) 
1. Five controlling shareholders (Thermo Electron, the Cox family, Barry Diller, John Malone, and Carl 
Icahn) executed multiple freezeouts in the sample. These controllers were coded as having repeat 
relationships with half or more of the special committee if they had such ties with at least one of the 
special committees they negotiated with. 
2. For the reasons discussed in Part III.A, widely-held companies and investment manager controllers 
were not categorized by the number of public companies under their control. 
If controlling shareholders reward cooperative directors with future patronage, then 
we should observe new relationships between directors and controlling shareholders after 
the freezeout closed. While professional ties from before the freezeout was announced are 
evidence ofrepeat relationships and reappointment behavior, it would be surprising if no 
director joined another company that the controller controlled after the freezeout. Figure 1 
focuses on the 45 independent directors that have multiple professional ties to the 
controlling shareholder, broken down by when the connections were formed. Consistent 
with the rewards thesis, I find that 44.4% of these directors only have past or ongoing ties 
with the controller from before the freezeout was announced, and conversely, 55.6% 
formed new post-freezeout connections. Curiously, past ties to the controlling shareholder 
appear to be a poor predictor of future ties: only 16% of independent directors who joined 
another controlled company after the freezeout (4 of25) had a pre-freezeout relationship 
with the controller as well. A potential explanation for this finding is that courts are 
currently willing to believe that directors who have worked with the controller once before 
can be independent, but they are more skeptical when two or more past connections exist. 
As a result, most controlling shareholders may be less inclined to select an individual for 
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an independent directorship if they have worked together at two or more prior companies. 
Finally, to render this discussion more concrete and to identify interesting cases for 
further investigation, Table 3 describes the five independent director-controlling 
shareholder pairings that share the largest number of professional ties. These vignettes 
illustrate how some directors have, over time, developed a mutually-beneficial network of 
relationships with the controlling shareholder. Consider, for example, J. David Wargo, who 
was a member of the special committee that blessed media mogul John Malone's 2003 
offer to freeze out the minority shareholders of On Command Corporation. Between 1998 
and 2003, while he was a director at On Command, Wargo simultaneously served on the 
boards of two other Malone-affiliated entities, Liberty Digital and OpenTV. Since the 
freezeout, Wargo has joined the boards of four more of Malone's companies: Liberty 
Global (and its predecessors), Discovery Communications (and its predecessor), Liberty 
Broadband, and Fun Technologies. Wargo has served on the board of seven of Malone's 
companies since 1999, making the Wargo-Malone link the most extensive in the dataset. 
Indeed, a shareholder activist group recently called Wargo one of"Malone's go-to directors 
over the years." 106 
y 
n=17 
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Ties ended befme 
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during freezeout) 
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Figure 1. Breakdown of independent directors with multiple professional ties 
As another illustration, consider Paul Gould, who was a member of the special 
committee that negotiated Malone's 2005 offer to freeze out the remaining shareholders of 
106. Letter from Dieter Waizenegger, Exec. Director, CtW Inv. Grp., to shareholders of Discovery Comm., 
Inc. 4 (Apr. 1, 2016), http://ctwinvestmentgroup.com/2016/04/ctw-letter-discovery-communications-
shareholders/ (click on the link to read the letter). 
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UnitedGlobalCom. According to the proxy statement, the fact that Gould had previously 
served on the boards of at least two of Malone's companies and was contemporaneously 
serving on a Malone-affiliated board was insufficient to disqualify his independence: 
The Special Committee noted that Mr. Gould's service on the boards of directors 
of various entities affiliated with Mr. Malone or in which Mr. Malone, directly 
or indirectly, was a substantial investor consisted in each case of service as an 
independent director. The Special Committee deemed Mr. Gould's receipt of 
fees with respect to this service as a director to be insufficiently material to 
undermine his independence, given Mr. Gould's personal finances. 107 
Ultimately, the most striking point that emerges from Table 3 is that, contrary to the 
practice assumed by most academics, controlling shareholders and controlled companies 
do not always treat business dealings---even extensive connections like the Wargo-Malone 
or Gould-Malone networks-as antithetical to independence. For instance, Gould was 
called an independent director in at least five of Malone's companies, and Wargo was an 
independent director at six. This odd reality is almost certainly a result of Delaware's 
indeterminacy toward director independence, which invites controlling shareholders to 
push the envelope. 108 
107. Liberty Media Int'I, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement Relating to Merger or Acquisition (Schedule 
14A), at 21-22 (May 3, 2005) (emphasis added). 
108. For a similar point in the deal protection setting, see Fermin Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New 
Look of Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1015, 1024 (2017). 
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Table 3. The Five Most-Entangled Controller-Independent Director Pairings 
Controlling 
Shareholder 
John Malone 
John Malone 
Ronald 
Perelman 
Barry Diller 
Thermo 
Electron Corp. 
Director 
J. David 
Wargo 
Paul Gould 
Paul Meister 
Alan Spoon 
Polyvios 
Vintiadis 
# 
7 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
5 • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
4 • 
• 
• 
• 
4 • 
• 
• 
• 
Professional Ties 
Description 
Independent Director, Liberty Digital (1999 to 2002) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, On 
Command (1998 to 2003) 
Independent Director, OpenTV 1 (2002 to 2007) 
Director, Fun Technologies 1 (2007 to 2008) 
Independent Director, Liberty Global 1 (2004 to Present) 
Independent Director, Discovery Communications 1 (2005 to 
Present) 
Independent Director, Liberty Broadband (2015 to Present) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, Tele-
communications Inc. 1 (1996 to 1999) 
Independent Director, Liberty lnteractive 1 (1999 to 2009) 
Independent Director, DirectTV 1 (2009 to 2010) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, Liberty 
Global1 (2004 to Present) 
Independent Director, Discovery Communications 1 (2005 to 
Present) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, MFW 
(1995 to 2011) 
Independent Director, Scientific Games 1 (2012 to Present) 
President, MacAndrews & Forbes (2014 to 2018) 
Director, vTv Therapeutics (2015 to 2018) 
Director, Revlon (2016 to Present) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, 
Ticketmaster (1997 to 2002) 
Director, The HealthCentral Network2 (2005 to 2011) 
Independent Director, IAC/InterActiveCorp (2003 to Present) 
Independent Director, Match Group (2015 to Present) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, Thermo 
TerraTech (1992 to 2000) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, Thermo 
Instrument Systems (1993 to 2000) 
Independent Director, Special Committee Member, Spectra 
Physics (1999 to 2001) 
Director, Randers Killam Group (1997 to 1999) 
1. Denotes companies in which the controlling shareholder held a large but less than 35% voting stake 
at the time of appointment. 
2. Alan Spoon became a director of HealthCentral in 2005 as a representative of venture capital firm 
Polaris Partners. Barry Diller, through IAC/InterActiveCorp, acquired a significant minority stake in 
HealthCentral in 2008. This type of connection where the controlling shareholder invests in a company 
that the independent director is already affiliated with is not typical of the ties in the sample. 
Thus far in this Part, I have offered evidence that controlling shareholders will re-
appoint friendly nominally independent directors to senior positions and directorships at 
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other firms under their control. As a result, directors can use their directorships as a portal 
of entry by which to form additional connections with and gain future benefits from 
controlling shareholders. From the perspective of the directors, other lucrative posts may 
be obtainable-if the directors remain on good terms with the controllers. Controlling 
shareholders' power to grant or withhold these benefits then has the potential to shape the 
directors' allegiances. I turn to that power next. 
C. Creating a Taxonomy of Controlling Shareholders 
The extent of controllers' ability to influence directors is not uniform. This distinction 
rarely appears in existing scholarship or jurisprudence about controlling shareholders. 
Controllers are instead portrayed with the attributes of a single person with plenary control: 
an "800-pound gorilla" 109 that can always fet its way or a "king" 110 or queen who likes 
the ego boost from her tremendous clout. 11 In reality, however, controlling shareholders 
come in many forms, such as families, widely-held corporations, investment companies, 
or as the recent financial crisis demonstrates, the U.S. government. The power of decision-
making actors within these various controlling entity types can be arrayed on a spectrum, 
with decision-making authority concentrated solely in one person's hands at one end and 
divided authority where decisions are reached by consensus at the other. Moreover, some 
controllers have influence over a vast portfolio of companies; others have far fewer 
holdings. Controlling shareholders also exhibit different attitudes toward director 
independence and the qualities they look for in their boards. For example, Dole's 
controlling shareholder David Murdock has said that, at his companies, he is "the boss" 
and "[t]he boss does what he wants to do." 112 By contrast, Warren Buffett, who controls 
Berkshire Hathaway, has said he prefers directors who not only "think and speak 
independently" but are also "shareholder-oriented"; 113 Buffett in fact handpicked some of 
Berkshire's outside directors from shareholders whose families own substantial Berkshire 
holdings to ensure that the directors' interests are aligned with those of Berkshire's 
minority shareholders. 114 
These attributes are not meant to be exhaustive or to create sharp lines; they simply 
illustrate that controlling shareholders are not uniform. The stark dichotomy between 
109. Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation, supra note 6, at 509. 
110. Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 571 
(2016). 
111. For notable exceptions, see Gilson, supra note 24, at 1649 (recognizing that "controlling shareholders 
come in different forms-for example, families as opposed to widely held corporations"); Kobi Kastiel, Executive 
Compensation in Controlled Companies, 90 IND. L.J. 1131, 1161 (2015) (collecting data on the "significant 
heterogeneity" across U.S. controlling shareholders and arguing that some types of controllers may be unwilling 
or unable to effectively monitor managerial pay). Some scholars have observed that different controlling 
shareholders establish control through different devices and argued that controllers who hold control through 
mechanisms that separate voting rights from equity ownership, such as dual class stock, are more likely to engage 
in self-dealing. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., Stock Pyramids, supra note 1, at 301-05 (finding high agency costs in 
firms with dual-class shares). These works, however, focus on controlling shareholders' incentives to extract 
private benefits, not their ability to do so. 
112. In re Dole Food Co., Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8703-VCL, 2015 WL 5052214, at *l, *5 (Del. 
Ch. Aug. 27, 2015). 
113. Letter from Warren Buffett, supra note 72, at 17. 
114. Id. at 19. 
2019] Beyond Beholden 543 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders that pervades the jurisprudence obscures the 
complex ways in which controllers can undermine director independence. Assessing how 
much and what type of pressure a controller can exert requires a more nuanced taxonomy. 
Drawing from the corporate governance and political science literature on power, 115 I offer 
an important first cut at such a framework by distinguishing controlling shareholders along 
two dimensions: the base of controlled entities and the concentration of decision-making 
authority. I discuss each factor in turn, with illustrations from the freezeouts in my data and 
other cases as appropriate. 
1. Base 
Base refers to the size of the network of businesses over which a controlling 
shareholder has authority. Empire builders-heads of conglomerates like Alphabet 
(formerly Google) and Berkshire Hathaway-are clear examples of controllers with a wide 
base of control. Companies that routinely retain control blocks in a portfolio of firms, such 
as venture capital and private equity funds, fall into this category as well. 
Just as increased firm size tends to mean more CEO power, 116 a wider base tends to 
mean more controlling shareholder power. In particular, base size does not affect the 
controller's power to remove directors from the board, but it does increase the controller's 
ability to reward for the simple reason that those who control more resources have more 
ways to dole out benefits. Most obviously, a controlling shareholder who controls a 
portfolio of companies can cause controlled firm A to enter into transactions that benefit a 
director on the board of controlled firm B. Two nominally independent directors on MFW' s 
board, for instance, received fees for legal and consulting services from another Perelman 
company, Scientific Games. 117 Deborah Norville, a nominally independent director of 
Sumner Redstone's Viacom, is an anchor of"Inside Edition," which is produced by another 
Redstone-controlled company, CBS. 118 
Increased base size also translates into more opportunities to make appointments for 
high-level posts. Controlling shareholders with control over a large portfolio of companies 
can reward a director who has served loyally on the board of one firm by asking her to join 
the board of another firm, and then another, and another. My empirical observations are 
115. There is a massive literature on "power" in public law, political science, and the social sciences. See, 
e.g., MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 53 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978) (defining power as 
"the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance"); Daryl J. Levinson, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term-Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 
130 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2016) (defining power in public law as "the ability of political actors to control the 
outcomes of contested decisionmaking processes and secure their preferred policies"); see generally Robert A. 
Dahl, The Concept of Power, 2 BEHAV. SCI. 201 (1957). For a discussion of power in corporate governance, see 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 992-95 (2010) [hereinafter Kahan & 
Rock, Embattled CE Os], which measures CEO power along three dimensions: decision making, second-guessing, 
and scope. 
116. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 115, at 993 (explaining that "[g]iven the CEO's power 
within a firm, a CEO of a larger firm is more powerful than a CEO of a smaller firm"); cf DAVID A. BALDWIN, 
POWER AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 77 (2016) (recognizing that, while power 
is not simply a function of resources, resources can be a convenient way of measuring power). 
117. See Jn re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 510-13 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
118. See Leslie Picker, Viacom in Cross Hairs of Activist investor, N.Y. TIMES: DEAi.BOOK (Jan. 19, 2016), 
https://www .n yti mes. com/2016/0 I /20/business/ deal book/viacom-in-cross-hai rs-of-activist-investor. h tm 1. 
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consistent with this intuition. A majority of the controlling shareholders in the data that 
have controlled multiple public companies-meaning that they have controlled multiple 
boards-have formed repeat relationships with at least one "independent" director on their 
board. Conversely, among controlling shareholders with only one public firm in their 
portfolio, only one has formed repeat ties with a nominally independent director. 119 
For a real-world illustration of how a wide base enables a system of patronage, 
consider the boardrooms controlled by the late Harold Simmons. Between 2000 and his 
death in 2013, Simmons controlled seven public companies: Keystone Consolidated 
Industries, Valhi, NL Industries, Kronos Worldwide, CompX International, Titanium 
Metals, and Tremont Corporation. Figure 2a depicts the network of individuals who were 
designated as independent directors of Simmons' companies during this time. 120 The white 
nodes represent controlled or dominated firms. The gray nodes represent nominally 
independent directors, with the shade of gray varying by the number of connections 
between the director and controlled companies. The darker the gray, the more connections 
that director has. As the visualization of Simmons' network reveals, Simmons regularly 
recruited directors of one controlled company to the board of another. Overall, of the 29 
nominally independent directors in Simmons' companies, 45% served on at least two 
Simmons-controlled boards. 
Also consider Figures 2b-2e, which shows the independent director networks for four 
other controlling shareholders with large bases: the Dolan family, John Malone, Rupert 
Murdoch, and Sumner Redstone. These four controlling shareholders controlled at least 
two firms within the S&P 1500 in 2015. 121 In each network, there are highly connected 
"independent" directors-including special committee members in most cases-who have 
served on the boards of multiple controlled or dominated companies. These are the 
controlling shareholders' "go-to" directors, and the directors whose relationship with the 
controller are most likely to be characterized by mutual indebtedness and reliance. As 
expected, controllers that control a very large base of subsidiary boards, like Malone, have 
many go-to "independent" directors. 
The idea that a controller's power to influence increases with the size of its base has 
particular relevance for venture capital and private equity firms. When a venture capital 
firm makes an investment, it normally obtains significant control rights in the portfolio 
company, including the right to one or more board seats. 122 As a result, venture capital 
firms can appoint individuals to a large number of boards over time. In In re Trados Inc. 
Shareholder Litigation, for example, Trados outside director Joseph Prang initially 
119. The controlling shareholder is Richard Hokin, who owns privately-held lntermountain Industries, Inc. 
A.J. Schwartz was an independent director at one oflntermountain's subsidiaries, Petroglyph Energy Inc., from 
1997 to its acquisition in 2000, see Petroglyph Energy, Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 6 (Apr. 27, 
2000), and then became a director of Intermountain. See INTERMOUNTA!N INDUSTRIES, INC., 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170930090332/http://www.intermountainindustries.com/industries.php. 
120. Data from BoardEx (on file with author). 
121. KAMONJOH, supra note 20, at 84-90. I excluded the Scripps family, which also held control over two 
S&P 1500 firms, because neither company is incorporated in Delaware and thus the concept of independence in 
Delaware law does not govern. 
122. See Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 967, 987 (2006); Jackson, supra note I 01, at 644. 
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developed a relationship with venture capital firm Sequoia Capital after Sequoia invested 
in a company where Prang was president. 123 Based on the success of that relationship, 
Sequoia designated Prang as a director of several other Sequoia-backed firms, including 
Trados. 124 Private equity firms similarly obtain control over the boards of their portfolio 
companies, and are thus able to appoint individuals to many boards. Izs Because venture 
capital and private equity firms are long-term repeat players, directors like Prang have 
substantial incentive to favor their interests. 126 However, Delaware courts rarely consider 
a controlling shareholder's repeat-player status in assessing independence, and they have 
not recofflzed venture capital or private equity firms' enhanced influence over 
directors. 27 As I argue in the next Part, the courts should adopt a more granular approach, 
one that pays more attention to controlling shareholder characteristics. 
2. Concentration 
Concentration relates to the number of decision-making entities that share the power 
to control within the controlling shareholder. Concentration, in turn, has two related facets: 
decisional allocation and spheres of influence. 
a. Decisional Allocation 
Controlling shareholders vary with respect to whether decision-making power is 
concentrated in the hands of a single actor or diffused across multiple actors with 
potentially different preferences and interests. Most of the controlling shareholders 
discussed in this Article, such as Perelman, Malone, and Simmons, are examples of the 
former; founding families, widely-held corporations, and partnerships are common 
examples of the latter. 128 
All else equal, when the authority to control is highly centralized in a single person, 
she has more power because she can secure her preferred outcomes. 129 She stands at the 
apex of a neatly hierarchical chain of command and can always get her way because she 
alone calls the shots. By contrast, when decision-making authority is divided among 
123. In re Trados lnc. S 'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54-55 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
124. Id. 
125. See William Magnuson, The Public Cost of Private Equity, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1847, 1861 (2018) 
("Since private equity firms control the boards of their portfolio companies, they can easily add directors to fill 
specific gaps in expertise, and they can compensate these board members highly"). 
126. See Fried & Ganor, supra note 122, at 989 (arguing that directors of portfolio companies are often not 
truly independent because they "have--or can expect to have~long-term professional and business ties" with the 
funds). 
127. See infra notes 162--{)4 and accompanying text. 
128. Cf Family Firms: Business in the Blood, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 1, 2014), https://www.economist.com/ 
news/busin ess/2162 93 8 5-compan i es-contro I led-founding-fami 1 ies-remai n-surprisingl y-important-and-look-set -
stay (reporting that family-controlled firms comprise 19% of Fortune Global 500 companies). 
129. See Michael J. Gerhardt, Constitutional Arrogance, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1649, 1651 (2016) (arguing that 
one factor contributing to the growth in presidential power is the "[t]he executive's unique design, with a single 
official at its apex, [which] positions Presidents perfectly to take positive independent action and invests them 
with the capacity to do so"). The Founding Fathers in fact emphatically rejected the idea of a plurality in the 
executive, observing that the difficulties of cooperation among a group of people may "tincture the exercise of 
the executive authority with a spirit of habitual feebleness and dilatoriness." THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander 
Hamilton). · 
2019] Beyond Beholden 547 
several actors, no single actor can independently impose her will. Instead of giving 
commands, each must bargain, cajole, appeal, reason, or litigate against others to influence 
decision outcomes. 130 These actors, put simply, only have the "power to persuade." 131 My 
findings corroborate this conclusion. Controlling shareholders who are single natural 
persons re-appoint nominally independent directors with far greater frequency than those 
that are family groups or widely-held firms, suggesting that single persons are able to act-
and reward-without the inefficiency and conflict that can hinder decision-making in 
collective entities. 132 
For a recent illustration of how diffuse power structures constrain decisional power, 
consider the ousting of Ferdinand Piech, the former chairman of the German automaker 
Volkswagen. The Porsche-Piech family, which also controls the automaker Porsche, 
gained 50.8% of the Volkswagen Group in 2008. 133 The family's holdings are organized 
through a holding company, Porsche Automobil Holding, in which family members 
separately own voting rights. 134 For many years, Ferdinand Piech owned a hefty 13% of 
the holding company, sat on its board, and as Volkswagen's CEO and later chairman, was 
considered the ruling patriarch of the Porsche-Piech family. 135 
In 2015, Piech publicly undermined Volkswagen's then-CEO, Martin Winterkom, 
saying "I am at a distance to Winterkom." 136 Piech soon discovered, however, that he had 
neither his family's support nor enough votes from other stakeholders on the Volkswagen 
board. Members of the family bluntly disagreed with Piech's remarks, commenting that 
Piech's "private" opinion about Winterkom was not the opinion of the family. 137 
Volkswagen's worker representatives, who also sit on its board, backed Winterkom as "one 
of the most successful car industry managers." 138 Two weeks after he moved to oust 
130. See Levinson, supra note 115, at 39 n.38 (suggesting that when decision-making authority is shared 
among multiple actors, each actor can only exert "influence"); Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers 
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 319-20 (2006) (arguing that the President faces a lower 
transaction cost in asserting power because the President can take unilateral actions); Terry M. Moe & William 
G. Howell, Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A Theory, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 850, 862--63 (1999) 
(arguing that Congress is "poorly equipped to take almost any kind of coherent, forceful action" because of its 
collective action problem). 
131. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF 
LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 11 (Free Press rev. ed. 1990)(1964). 
132. See, e.g., William T. Allen & William R. Berkley, In Defense of the CEO Chair, 81 HARV. Bus. REV. 
24, 25 (2003) (arguing that multiple "centers of authority" in a business, such as separate CEO and board chairman 
roles, "would create the potential for organizational tension and instability"). 
133. See Dietmar Hawranek, The VW Debt Trap: Has Porsche Bitten Off More than it Can Chew?, SPIEGEL 
ONLINE (Apr. 20, 2009), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-vw-debt-trap-has-porsche-bitten-off-
more-than-it-can-chew-a-620020.html. 
134. See Dietmar Hawranek & Dirk Kurbjuweit, Blood Feud: Behind the Scenes of Volkswagen's Dynastic 
Battle, SPIEGEL ONLINE (May 6, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/international/business/the-families-at-the-center-
of-the-power-struggle-at-volkswagen-a-l 03221 O.html. 
135. See id.; Dalia Fahmy, With Piech in the Exit Lane, Porsche Family Feud Draws to Close, BLOOMBERG 
(Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-17 /ferdinand-piech-in-talks-to-sell-shares-
in-volkswagen-s-owner (describing Piech as "the family's undisputed patriarch"). 
136. See Chris Bryant, Volkswagen Power Struggle Deepens as Porsche Weighs Jn, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 12, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/71 d27596-e0f2-l I e4-9b30-00 l 44feab7de [subscription required]. 
137. See id. 
138. See Chris Bryant, VW Chairman Hints at Tension with CEO, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2015), 
https://www.ft.com/content/be7fl b4c-df8a- l l e4-b6da-OO l 44feab7de. 
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Winterkom, Piech was himself forced to resign from Volkswagen's board. 139 Just before 
his departure, Piech was at the head of his family, which in turn controlled Volkswagen's 
voting shares, but his power rested on his family members' confidence and support. As 
German magazine Der Spiegel summarized, Piech's inability to get his way resulted from 
the fact that, this time, he couldn't "succeed in persuading [his family] that his position was 
the right one." 140 
The boundaries between concentrated and diffuse power structures can appear porous. 
Michael Eisner, the longtime CEO and Chairman of Disney (though not a controlling 
shareholder), was able to "enthrone[] himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of 
his personal Magic Kingdom" and bypass his board, which ostensibly had veto authority 
over his decisions, when he hired his good friend as Disney's president. 141 While Eisner 
formally shared power with his board, he gained such a substantial bargaining advantage 
from his status and prestige that he could essentially rely on commands to get what he 
wanted. 142 
But the fact that status yields bargaining advantages should not be allowed to conceal 
a basic difference between leadership and unilateralism: when power is diffused, decisions 
are always the product of give-and-take. No matter her leverage, each actor's ability to 
influence the outcome is ultimately dependent on the consent of the other actors, and this 
power reduces to nothingness if consent is withdrawn. Peter Strauss has recognized this, 
arguing that a meaningful difference exists between "ordinary respect" and deference and 
"[c]ompelled obedience." 143 Eisner, like Piech, was ultimately forced to resign from 
Disney when he lost the support of two directors, who successfully rallied Disney's 
shareholders to oppose Eisner's re-election to Disney's board. 144 
b. Spheres of Influence 
Acting in concert with decisional allocation, "sphere of influence" refers to the types 
of decisions over which an actor has control. 145 In some controlling entities, power can be 
somewhat specialized; that is, a decision-maker who can determine the outcome of one 
type of decision cannot determine the outcome of another type. For example, when the 
U.S. government was the controlling shareholder of the American International Group 
(AIG), the Treasury Department appointed a special master for executive compensation, 
popularly known as the "pay czar," who had final authority over compensation decisions 
139. See Hawranek & Kurbjuweit, supra note 134. 
140. Id. 
141. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
142. Cf Dahl, supra note 115, at 203 (describing the source of presidential power as including "his influence 
with the national electorate, his charisma, his charm, and the like"). 
143. Peter L. Strauss, Foreword: Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 704 (2007). 
144. See David Teather, Disney Shareholders Force Eisner out of Chairman's Role, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 
4, 2004), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2004/mar/04/usnews.citynews; Laura M. Holson, A Quiet 
Departure for Eisner at Disney, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/26/business/ 
media/ a-q uiet-departure-for-eisner-at-d isney .html . 
145. Robert Dahl refers to this concept as the "scope" of an actor's power. "Scope" measures the types of 
responses A can evoke from B. See Dahl, supra note 115, at 203. 
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for AIG's senior executives. 146 Meanwhile, the Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve created a separate entity, the AIG Credit Facility Trust, which had the sole power 
to vote the government's AIG shares. 147 Among the trustees' main responsibilities was 
recruiting and appointing new directors to ensure that AIG had "an effective, independent 
and capable board."148 Still other divisions in the government had broad influence over 
AI G's restructuring plans and risk management policies. 149 
Dispersing qualitatively different aspects of the power to control to different spheres, 
governed by different personnel, further limits each actor's ability to reward or retaliate. 150 
AIG's Credit Facility trustees, for instance, could appoint directors to or remove directors 
from AIG's board, but they could not direct AIG's business toward cooperative directors 
because the trustees were barred from interfering with AIG's operational decisions. 151 For 
the same reason, the trustees could not punish directors who displeased them by cutting off 
an existing service contract. 
De jure barriers are of course not de facto barriers. In many cases, there is a 
pronounced gap between an actor's limited de jure sphere of influence and the extent of 
the decisions over which she has power in practice. From a strictly de jure vantage, CEOs 
of most widely-held corporations have no authority to elect members of the board. Post-
Enron rules require that nominating committees consisting entirely of "independent" 
directors control the director selection process. 152 Commentators have noticed, however, 
that formal barriers to CEO involvement are not sufficient to actually insulate nomination 
decisions from CEO influence. 153 Some nominating committees "receiv[ e] names from the 
CE0." 154 Moreover, nominating committees are often "unlikely to nominate a director 
146. Deborah Solomon, Pay Czar Gets Broad Authority Over Executive Compensation, WALL STREET J. 
(June 11, 2009), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 124464909136002467. 
147. AIG: Where is the Taxpayers' Money Going?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Oversight & Gov 't 
Reform, 111 th Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust), 
https://oversight.house.gov/sites/democrats.oversight.house.gov/files/migrated/20090512165555 .pdf 
[hereinafter AIG Credit Facility Trustees Statement]. 
148. Id. at 6--8. 
149. See id. 
150. See Kahan & Rock, Embattled CEOs, supra note 115, at 993 (explaining that "[t]he more 
comprehensive the type of decisions (over which the CEO has authority], the more powerful is the CEO"). 
151. See AIG Credit Facility Trustees Statement, supra note 147, at 5. 
152. See Michael E. Murphy, The Nominating Process for Corporate Boards of Directors: A Decision-
Making Analysis, 5 BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 131, 148 (2008) (explaining that "NYSE rules ... require the nominating 
committee to be composed entirely of independent directors"); see also Gordon, supra note 17, at 1498-99 
(describing SEC disclosure requirements that are intended to shield nominating committees from CEO influence). 
153. See, e.g., BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52, at 25-27 (arguing that "[e]ven CEOs not formally serving 
on the nominating committee have had a significant influence on the nomination process"); Murphy, supra note 
152, at 148-49 (arguing that "it is clear that CEO's [sic] may have the dominant voice in the nominating process 
even if not included in the membership of a nominating committees [sic] composed of independent directors"); 
cf Nadia Damouni et al., Dimon Wields Large Influence Over Who Serves on JPMorgan Board, HUFFPOST (July 
16, 2013 ), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/16/dimon-jpmorgan-board _ n _3283683.html (explaining 
that "JPMorgan board's governance committee, responsible for hiring new members, relies almost entirely on 
referrals from management to find director nominees"). 
154. ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 246 (4th ed. 2008). A CEO told 
Robert Monks and Nell Minow, "My nominating committee is very independent. Sometimes they tum down the 
names l send them." Id; see also JAY W. LoRSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY 
OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 20 (1989) (finding that 55% of directors reported that "the CEO was the 
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clearly opposed by the CEO," so at a minimum, CEOs have the power to block 
nominations. 155 These informal practices enable CEOs to dominate the selection process 
despite barriers that exist on paper. 
To summarize, controlling shareholders are weaker when the power to control is 
diffused or functionally separated because of the difficulties of cooperation among a group 
of actors. As a result, they are less able to pressure directors effectively. 
* * * 
This Part provides the first empirical evidence on professional connections between 
directors who are nominally independent and the controlling shareholders they are 
supposed to be independent from. The revelation that some "independent" directors share 
repeat relationships with a controlling shareholder-and in particular, some directors 
obtain new ties to a controlling shareholder after concurring with that controller's views-
offers powerful support for my theory that controlling shareholders will reward cooperative 
directors. By extension, these findings suggest that nominally independent directors can be 
biased by the prospect of those future benefits. 
Recognizing reward's role in the director's incentive calculus is important because 
patronage triggers no special scrutiny and little disclosure, and thus can work better than 
threats. The firing of an independent director receives intense media attention, 156 and even 
the threat of firing or other retribution can trigger a higher level of judicial scrutiny. 157 In 
contrast, a controlling shareholder can discuss a future benefit at any time without public 
notice. When a director actually joins another board under the controlling shareholder's 
control, she is not required to disclose information about their past relationship. 158 
Controlling shareholders thus have every incentive to prefer seducing directors with the 
prospect of future rewards over using threats. 
Of course, not all controlling shareholders are created equal or are equally able to dole 
out benefits (or punishment). The two factors that I have identified in this Part provide an 
analytic framework for assessing which controlling shareholders have greater potential to 
offer future patronage, and by extension, create conflicts of interest. As the next Part 
argues, courts can move toward a more nuanced doctrine for constraining private benefits 
of control by disaggregating controllers in this way. 
major source of ideas for new candidates"). 
155. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 52, at 26-27. 
156. See Sallie Hofmeister, Cablevision Power Play Alarms Wall Street, Governance Experts, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/04/business/fi-dolan4 (describing how Charles Dolan fired 
four Cablevision directors who voted to end his pet project); Emily Steel, Redstone Moves to Replace Five Viacom 
Directors, Escalating Battle, N. Y. TIMES (June 16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/17 /business/ 
media/five-viacom-directors-are-replaced-in-escalation-of-redstone-battle. html (describing how Sumner and 
Shari Redstone fired five ofViacom's independent directors who did not show sufficient loyalty). 
157. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
158. Cf Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The Case for Improving Director Independence Disclosure, 
43 J. CORP. L. 35, 58--60 (2017) (arguing that important information is often omitted in a company's disclosures 
about director independence in part because companies are only required to report relationships that they consider 
"material"). My review of SEC filings for the controlled companies in this Article is consistent with Nili 's 
argument. 
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IV. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
In this Part, I discuss three doctrinal and theoretical implications of my empirical 
findings. First, Delaware courts should depart from the operative assumption that all 
controlling shareholders hold equal sway over the directors who serve on their boards. 
Rather, courts should tailor the level of deference afforded to independent directors' 
decisions by the controlling shareholder's ability to influence director behavior. Second, 
Delaware courts should not assume that, absent signs of a bribe, post-transaction 
relationships contain no information relevant to a director's independence at the time of 
the deal. Again, courts should examine controlling shareholder attributes to identify cues 
about a director's expectations at the time she approved the transaction. And third, 
Delaware courts and scholars should understand freezeout transactions as presenting an 
asymmetric final period problem, meaning that nominally independent directors may be 
influenced by the fact that their relationship with minority shareholders will end once the 
freezeout closes but their relationship with the controlling shareholder can still continue. 
This insight contributes a new perspective on freezeout doctrine and recent proposals to 
improve it. I discuss each of these implications in turn. 
A. Enhanced Scrutiny for Powerful Controllers 
The findings presented in this Article should change the contours of the ongoing 
debate over structural pressures. As mentioned above, scholars like Bebchuk and Hamdani 
have argued that nominally independent directors will inevitably be influenced by 
structural realities, such as the fact that the controlling shareholder has the power to remove 
them from the board. 159 On the other hand, recent Delaware cases have retreated from the 
view that independent directors cannot be truly independent from a controlling 
shareholder. 160 By their account, structural incentives will not prevent most nominally 
independent directors from pushing back and performing their monitoring duties "with 
fidelity." 161 
This debate is misdirected if controlling shareholders are not monolithic and if 
159. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6 (arguing that the controlling 
shareholders' decisive power to appoint and fire directors prevent directors from being truly independent); Maria 
Gutierrez & Maribel Saez, supra note 26 (arguing that nominally independent directors lack incentives to 
effectively monitor controllers for a variety of structural reasons). 
160. Early Delaware cases appeared open to the possibility that a director can be truly independent of the 
controlling shareholder that appointed her to the board and can remove her from the board. See, e.g., Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 816 (Del. 1984) ("It is the care, attention and sense of individual responsibility to the 
performance of one's duties, not the method of election, that generally touches on independence."). But by the 
1990s, the Delaware court "implicitly endorse[ d] the view that independent directors cannot be truly independent 
from the controlling shareholder, and that courts still need to scrutinize freezeout transactions for entire fairness 
because of the inability to replicate an arms-length process between the controlling shareholder and the (special 
committee]." Subramanian, supra note 2, at 15 (describing Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110, 1118 
(Del. 1994)). In contrast, more recent cases seem to have abandoned the court's prior skepticism. See In re MFW 
S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 528 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("Although it is possible that there are independent directors 
who have little regard for their duties or for being perceived by their company's stockholders (and the larger 
network of institutional investors) as being effective at protecting public stockholders, the court thinks they are 
likely to be exceptional .... "). 
161. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 528. 
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variation exists in how much pressure they can exert over the directors who serve on their 
boards. Structural pressures may pose a very serious risk to directors' independence vis-a-
vis some controlling shareholders but not others. A more useful question then is how to 
distinguish controllers who tend to hold more sway from those who tend to hold less. The 
two factors presented in Part III give courts an analytic framework for thinking about this 
problem. For example, courts should be particularly wary when the controlling shareholder 
is an individual person who controls a vast conglomerate and can single-handedly 
determine the outcomes of important company decisions. Courts should also pay more 
attention to reward-oriented structural incentives ifthe potential for repeat relationships is 
high, for example, if the controlling shareholder is an investment firm that regularly 
appoints directors to the boards of its portfolio companies. 
Delaware courts have never considered these or any other controlling shareholder 
characteristics in its independence inquiry. In the Jn re Trados Inc. Shareholders Litigation 
decision, however, the Delaware Chancery Court noted that the venture capital 
"ecosystem" may provide incentives for nominally independent directors to favor venture 
capital firms over other shareholders when their interests diverge: "Many of these 
[supposedly independent] directors have--0r can expect to have-long-term professional 
and business ties with the VCs, who are more likely to be repeat players than are most of 
the common shareholders. Cooperative outside directors can expect to be recommended 
for other board seats or even invited to join the VC fund as a 'venture partner."' 162 
However, the court then said that "general characterizations" of this ecosystem cannot 
carry the plaintiffs burden of proving non-independence at trial. 163 Because the plaintiff 
also introduced evidence of the director's "long history" with the venture capital fund, the 
court agreed that the director's independence was compromised. 164 
While the court in Trados explicitly disavowed placing weight on broad structural 
influences, the fact that venture capital firms can secure coveted jobs for friendly directors 
in the future was unmistakably on the court's mind. Subsequent Delaware doctrine should 
incorporate this attention to controlling shareholders' ability to exert pressure. 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that controlling shareholder characteristics should be 
determinative of director independence. My point, rather, is that courts should be aware of 
the fact that some controllers have more means to influence directors and thus pose a 
greater risk to independence. And while it may not be possible for courts to neatly separate 
the wheat from the chaff, there are some simple cues that courts should factor in when 
assessing whether to defer to nominally independent directors' judgements. One 
straightforward way to incorporate the insights here into doctrine is to change the operative 
assumption that a special committee of nominally independent directors should either 
receive full credit as a "cleansing" device for a conflicted transaction or none at all. This 
approach is hardly novel; in many other contexts, Delaware courts already use intermediate 
standards ofreview for "specific, recurring, and readily identifiable situations" where the 
"realities of the decision-making context can subtly undermine the decisions of even 
162. In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 54 (Del. Ch. 2013) (quoting Fried & Ganor, supra note 
122, at 989). 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 54-55. 
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independent and disinterested directors."165 When the context warrants intermediate 
scrutiny, courts have given nominally independent directors a form of partial deference by 
reviewing the reasonableness of their actions. 166 
B. A Harder Look at Post-Transaction Relationships 
In In re .MFW Shareholders Litigation, the Delaware Chancery Court explained that 
Viet Dinh's subsequent directorship at another Perelman-controlled firm would only be 
relevant to Dinh's independence if the evidence also showed that Dinh "was offered the 
directorship before the special committee approved the deal, or that it had at least been 
discussed with him before th[ at] time." 167 Finding no such evidence in the record, the court 
deemed Dinh to be sufficiently independent of Perelman. 168 
.MFW and similar cases demonstrate judges' reluctance to see a conflict of interest 
absent a smoking gun: an outright bribe. But this narrow fixation depends on a judgment 
that otherwise independent directors are unlikely to have tacit expectations of future 
patronage. My findings challenge this assumption. Among the nominally independent 
directors who served on boards dominated by Perelman-type controlling shareholders-
individual persons who control a large conglomerate-almost half were re-appointed by 
the controller to a directorship or an executive position at another controlled company. 
When faced with these odds, most sophisticated directors would recognize that it is in their 
self-interest to cultivate their relationship with the controlling shareholder, even if no 
discussion about a future appointment has taken place. 
The court in .MFW also missed a second contextual cue that relates to Dinh's 
expectations about Perelman. Like Dinh, the chairman of M&F Worldwide's special 
committee also joined the board of a Perelman-dominated company three months after the 
freezeout closed. 169 And a third member of the special committee had a long history of 
working at Perelman-controlled entities before joining M&F Worldwide's board. 170 In 
cases involving threats of retaliation, Delaware courts have held that when the controlling· 
shareholder actually removes an uncooperative director, "[t]hat action convey[s] more 
strongly than words the type of retributive threat that [the controlling shareholder is] 
willing to carry out" against the remaining directors. 171 By the same token, it seems 
appropriate to infer that Perelman's demonstrated willingness to re-appoint other familiar 
(and presumably friendly) directors would have increased Dinh's expectations ofa similar 
165. ldat43. 
166. As every student of corporate law knows, where a board adopts anti-takeover defensive measures, 
Delaware courts will examine whether the measure was reasonable in response to the threat. See Unocal Corp. v. 
Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985); Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651A.2d1361, 1367 (DeL 
1995). Further, where a company is in Revlon mode (when a sale or break-up of the company is inevitable), 
Delaware courts will examine whether the board proceeded "reasonably" in its role as auctioneer. Equity-Linked 
Jnv'rs, L.P. v. Adams, 705 A.2d 1040, 1055 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
167. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 513 n.65 (Del. Ch. 2013), ajf'd sub nom. Kahn v. M & F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 648 (Del. 2014); see supra note 49-50 and accompanying text. 
168. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 513. 
169. Data from BoardEx (on file with author). 
170. In re MFW S'holders Litig., 67 A.3d at 513 (describing Perelman's ties to Carl Webb). 
171. In re Ezcorp Inc. Consulting Agreement Derivative Litig., C.A. No. 9962-VCL, 2016 WL 301245, at 
*41 (Del. Ch. Jan. 25, 2016). 
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reward. 
Viewed in this light, Dinh's subsequent directorship is probably evidence that Dinh's 
independence was tainted at the time that the special committee approved the transaction. 
At the very least, it reveals the question of Dinh's independence to be far closer than the 
Chancery Court allowed. My general point is that Delaware courts should not presume that 
post-transaction ties contain no relevant information absent signs of a bribe. 
It bears emphasis that post-transaction ties are subject to the same critiques that many 
have leveled at using past and ongoing connections as proxies for independence. 172 Most 
fundamentally, directors do not become genuinely independent just because they have no 
ties to the controlling shareholder, and conversely, directors do not automatically become 
supine just because they do. 173 Eliminating pre- or post-transaction ties, moreover, may not 
be costless. For one thing, it shrinks the overall pool of qualified candidates for independent 
director positions and may promote directors "who lack any real desire to take their 
monitoring role seriously" as independent. 174 This second concern can be somewhat 
blunted if courts keep in mind that not all relationships are equally probative of a director's 
motivations or expectations. An economic connection to a controlling shareholder who is 
a repeat player and has shown a willingness to reward pliable directors in the past is very 
different from a social connection to a controller with a small base of influence and no 
history of repeat relationships. 
What giving attention to post-transaction ties will do, however, is promote doctrinal 
consistency. A central claim of this Article is that, just as a feeling ofbeholdenness toward 
the controlling shareholder can compromise a director's impartiality, the prospect of future 
reward from the controlling shareholder can also impact director behavior. Delaware courts 
scrutinize directors' past or ongoing relationships to the controlling shareholder because, 
so the argument goes, these ties can signal that a director is beholden to the controller at 
the time of the deal negotiations. 175 Post-transaction relationships are informative for the 
exact same reason: they can be cues about a director's expectations at the time the director 
approved the transaction. Judges and scholars do not seem to be making this connection 
across relationships formed at different times, and in particular they only take a hard look 
at past or ongoing relationships, not post-transaction relationships, without any 
acknowledgement of or justification for the distinction. 
172. See infra note 173 and accompanying text. 
173. See, e.g., MONKS & MINOW, supra note 154, at 286 ("Directors do not become independent just because 
they have no economic ties to the company beyond their job as a director"); Letter from Warren Buffett, 
Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders 18 (Feb. 28, 2007), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/ 
letters/2006ltr.pdf ("[M]any directors who are now deemed independent by various authorities and observers are 
far from that."); Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the 
Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 798-99 (2001) (noting the 
same). 
174. Langevoort, supra note 173, at 798-99; accord Kenneth 8. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special 
Litigation Committees, and the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1341 (2005) (arguing 
that the prevailing requirements for independence does not produce "the combination of traits that the corporation 
would have prioritized had its sole objective been to assemble the best possible board team"). 
175. SeesupraPartll.B.l. 
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C. Understanding Freezeouts as Presenting an Asymmetric Final Period Problem 
One of the basic tenets of game theory is that two rational actors who expect to engage 
in future dealings have an incentive to cooperate. 176 The risk that one party will self-deal 
or cheat is constrained by the threat of retribution from the other party in subsequent 
interactions. 177 This accountability breaks down, however, when participants know that a 
transaction is the last in the series. 178 In the final period, participants are more likely to put 
their own interests over those of the other party because the penalty for doing so has 
disappeared. 179 
It is well understood that third-party acquisitions present a final period problem 
because the target's shareholders will be bought out by the acquirer. 180 As a result, the 
efficacy of shareholders as a constraint on directors self-dealing loses traction. 181 Less 
familiar is the idea that freezeouts can present an asymmetric final period problem if the 
controlling shareholder has the ability to provide future patronage. On the one hand, a 
director's relationship with minority shareholders will normally end after a freezeout 
because outside directors typically leave the target board once the company goes private. 
On the other hand, a director's relationship with the controlling shareholder can still 
continue, as the numerous examples of post-freezeout ties that I have already offered 
illustrate. 
Recognition ofthis asymmetric final period dynamic advances on at least two debates 
in the literature about freezeout doctrine. Most directly, it confounds the theoretical 
assumption that nominally independent directors might block some freezeouts that are 
actually fair to public shareholders to advance their personal self-interest. Guhan 
Subramanian, for example, has argued that special committee directors might resist against 
a freezeout offer in order to entrench themselves in office. 182 Subramanian thus concluded 
that freezeout doctrines that provide the special committee with veto power over the deal 
will discourage some value-increasing freezeouts. 183 But the exact opposite is true in the 
asymmetric final period model: if the controlling shareholder has the power to act as a 
repeat benefactor, then self-interest would more likely propel special committee directors 
to go along with the controlling shareholder's proposal. A director who votes to reject a 
freezeout offer will likely be unseated by the controlling shareholder at the next election, 
176. See generally ROBERT AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 174-75 (rev. ed. 2006) (1984) 
(describing "conditions for the evolution of cooperation"). 
177. See RONALDJ. GILSON &BERNARDS. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 
720 (2d ed. 1995). 
178. See id 
179. See id 
180. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, Omnicare's Silver Lining, 38 J. CORP. L. 795, 809 (2013) (describing a 
"negotiated corporate acquisition [as] a paradigmatic example of a final period problem"); Bernard Black & 
Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 521, 
536 (2002) (describing acquisitions as a scenario in which "the target's managers and board will likely lose their 
positions" and thus "are in a final period where reputation and fear of future discipline lose their force as 
constraints on self-interested behavior."). See generally Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last 
Period of Play, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1941-47 (2003). 
181. See G1iffith, supra note 180, at 1945; Laster, supra note 180, at 809-10. 
182. See Subramanian, supra note 2, at 39-40 (describing the "obvious concern" that independent directors 
"might reject some freezeout offers out of self-interest rather than the interest of minority shareholders"). 
183. See id. 
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if not earlier, so any benefits ofresistance will be fleeting. Accommodation is the far better 
strategy for reaping long-term benefits. From this perspective, there is no conceptual reason 
to believe that giving the special committee veto power will deter some socially efficient 
freezeouts. 
Second, some scholars have suggested that nominally independent directors would be 
more effective in overseeing controlling shareholders if minority shareholders can hold 
directors accountable at the ballot box. 184 In a recent article, Bebchuk and Hamdani 
proposed empowering minority shareholders over certain director appointment, reelection, 
and removal decisions-for instance, by giving minority shareholders veto rights over 
those outcomes. 185 Bebchuk and Hamdani argued that these "enhanced-independence 
directors" should play a dominant role in negotiating self-dealing transactions, such as 
freezeouts, because they are properly motivated to safeguard minority investors' 
interests. 186 
I agree with the core intuition that nominally independent directors would be better 
guardians in ordinary conflict situations if they had incentives to be accountable to minority 
shareholders. But the same result does not necessarily follow for freezeouts. Nominally 
independent directors will typically be less responsive to minority shareholder discipline 
durin~ freezeout negotiations because the director-shareholder relationship will soon 
end. 1 7 At the same time, those directors will be motivated to stay on good terms with 
controlling shareholders that remain a source of potential benefits. The key point is this: 
merely increasing the degree to which minority investors can influence director elections, 
without reducing controlling shareholders' ability to reward directors after the deal, cannot 
effectively induce nominally independent directors to have robust freezeout negotiations 
with controlling shareholders. 
184. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6; cf George W. Dent, Jr., Toward 
Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 907-08 (proposing giving a 
firm's ten or twenty largest shareholders control over the director election process). 
185. See Bebchuk & Hamdani, Independent Directors, supra note 6, at 1293-1304. 
186. id. at 1306-07. 
187. Of course, if the minority shareholders also can appoint directors to new board seats post freezeout or 
provide other benefits, then the directors might be more motivated to resist controller opportunism. While the fact 
that institutional shareholders now own approximately 80% of outstanding shares in S&P 500 companies might 
suggest that they have leverage over independent directors as repeat players, see Neil Stewart, Retail 
Shareholders: Looking Out for the Little Guy, IR MAG. (May 15, 2012), https://www.irmagazine.com/ 
shareholder-targeting-id/retail-shareholders-looking-out-little-guy, these shareholders have proven reluctant to 
interfere in their portfolio companies. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, l 13 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 886-88 
(2013) (discussing the evidence showing that institutional investors have not played an active steward role in their 
portfolio firms); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048 (2007) (citing regulatory constraints, incentives, and conflicts of interest 
as factors that prevent mutual funds from acting as effective monitors); Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., The Agency 
Problems of Institutional investors, 31 J. ECON. PERSPECTNES 89, 90 (2017) (demonstrating that "index funds 
have especially poor incentives to engage in stewardship activities that could improve governance and increase 
value"); cf also Giovanni Strampelli, How to Enhance Directors' independence at Controlled Companies, 44 J. 
CORP. L. 103, 127, 133-36 (2018) (arguing, for a reason different from my own, that institutional investor 
passivity "may significantly impair the effectiveness of the Bebchuk and Hamdani proposal" and suggesting the 
need for an entity to coordinate institutional investor voting). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
This Article establishes the prospect of reward, or patronage, from the controlling 
shareholder as an important factor in the incentive calculus of nominally independent 
directors. Judges and scholars miss half the story when they view independence solely 
through the lens ofbeholdenness and retribution. I show that controlling shareholders can 
and do form repeat relationships with the nominally independent directors who serve on 
their boards, and the prospect of this patronage can compromise those directors' ability to 
prevent controlling shareholder opportunism. 
By orienting the independence inquiry toward reward, this Article also exposes the 
value of a more granular account of controlling shareholders---one that contends with the 
heterogeneity among the people and entities within that broad category. When jurists and 
scholars invoke the term "controlling shareholders," they are in fact pointing to a plurality 
of actors, governance techniques, and bargaining dynamics. Efficient regulation of 
companies with controllers requires a better understanding of this heterogeneity than we 
now have. I have offered a framework that disaggregates controlling shareholders to allow 
more precise analysis of their ability to influence director behavior, and I hope this Article 
will encourage more work in a similar vein. 
*** 
